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THE WRITINGS OF JOHN BARKER WAITE
AND THOMAS DAVIES ON THE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Yale Kamisar*
INTRODUCTION
After browsing through many volumes of the Michigan Law
Review, searching for the article I would discuss on the occasion of the
law review's 100th anniversary, I wound up with two "finalists": a 1955
article by Professor John Barker Waite on the law of arrest search and
seizure (on further reflection, four Michigan Law Review
commentaries on the general subject written by Waite between 1933
and 1955)' and a monumental 200-page article (surely one of the
longest articles ever to appear in the Michigan Law Review) by
Thomas Davies on the "original Fourth Amendment. 2
Convincing myself that their writings could be made to fit together,
I resolved the matter by choosing the works of both commentators.
One important consideration was my belief that each had something
important to say about the search and seizure exclusionary rule, a
controversy that, despite eighty years of intense debate, shows no
signs of letting up.' Waite and Davies are a study in contrasts. Waite
* Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor, University of Michigan Law
School; Visiting Professor, University of San Diego Law School. A.B. 1950, N.Y.U.; LL.B.
1954, Columbia; LL.D. 1978 John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New
York; LL.D. 1979, Puget Sound.
1. John Barker Waite, Comment, Evidence - Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence,
42 MICH. L. REV. 679 (1944) [hereinafter Waite (1944)]; John Barker Waite, Judges and the
Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REV. 169 (1955) [hereinafter Waite (1955)]; John Barker Waite,
Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 MICH. L. REV. 749 (1933) [hereinafter Waite
(1933)]; J.B.W., Comment, Searches and Seizures - The Criterion of Reasonableness, 42
MICH. L. REV. 147 (1943) [hereinafter Waite (1943)].
2. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547 (1999).
3. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, First Principles]; Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Christopher Slobogin,
Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363; Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994); William J.
Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rules, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443
(1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Virtues and Vices].
Judge (later Justice) Benjamin Cardozo once opined that "[t]o what [has been] written
[about the exclusionary rule], little of value can be added." People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (N.Y. 1926). He made this comment three-quarters of a century ago! But it does not
1821
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was sympathetic to the needs and interests of the police and he
resented the attempts of the courts "to control police conduct by the
indirection of rules of evidence judicially made for that purpose."4 If
anything, Davies believes the courts are too timid in placing
restrictions on the police.
Waite was a colorful, crusty law professor who wrote with power
and passion. Sometimes, as he noted, he drew upon his own frequent
contacts with the police and his observations of their methods.5
Although the author of a major empirical study,6 Davies, as his
Michigan article well demonstrates, is a prodigious "library
researcher." His arguments are spelled out painstakingly and his
writing is heavily footnoted.'
Professor Waite was a member of the University of Michigan law
faculty from 1912-51.' Although the grandson of the seventh Chief
Justice of the United States, Morrison R. Waite, he did not treat
seem to have had a chilling effect on many law professors. (Of course, in the Defore case
Judge Cardozo proceeded to write some of the most famous lines ever written on the
subject.)
4. Waite (1944), supra note 1, at 691.
5. Waite (1933), supra note 1, at 766 n.36. In another article, Professor Waite disclosed
that "[d]uring the later years of prohibition [he] participated as spectator in numerous police
raids on blind pigs." Waite (1944), supra note 1, at 685.
6. Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About
the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 [hereinafter Davies,
A Hard Look].
7. Davies' Michigan Law Review article contains 574 footnotes, some fifty of which are
at least half a page long. Davies, supra note 2. It should be pointed out that as big as Davies'
article is, it is dwarfed by William J. Cuddihy's 1,696 page unpublished 1990 doctoral
dissertation on the origins and original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See William J.
Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning (1990) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Claremont Graduate School). Dissenting in Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995), Justice O'Connor called Cuddihy's dissertation "one of the
most exhaustive analyses of the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment." (It is hard to
see how anyone could dispute that.) The dissertation is the subject of a thoughtful essay
review. Morgan Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1707 (1996). Davies refers to Cuddihy's dissertation a number of times, but does not always
agree with him. Cuddihy only examines search and seizure up to 1791. On the other hand,
much of Davies' article discusses how and why nineteenth century developments
undermined the assumptions and expectations regarding the drafting and adoption of the
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 2, at 655 n.299. Consider Larry Kramer,
Fidelity to History - and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1641 (1997), who wrote:
"[W]e cannot know [whether the original understanding still makes sense] until we have
examined what happened after. Subsequent history is essential to determine what our
Constitution has become and to decide what it should continue becoming."
8. One of Professor Waite's many students was John D. Voelker, who wrote the best-
selling murder mystery, Anatomy of a Murder, under his pen name, Robert Traver. ROBERT
TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958). At one point in Voelker's book, the defense
lawyer recalls what "my old Crimes professor, J. B. 'Jabby' White," had told him about the
law of homicide. Id. at 37. This is an obvious reference to Professor Waite - he sometimes
signed his work J. B. Waite and he was sometimes called "Jabby" Waite. Moreover, when a
gathering of alumni honored him a dozen years after his retirement, Waite told the group
that Voelker had made him famous by referring to him in the book.
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judges (or Supreme Court justices) kindly. He blamed them for
"deliberately restrict[ing] police efficiency in the discovery of
criminals."9 By protecting "discovered criminal[s]" from "deserved
punishment," charged Waite, "judges are derogating from the force of
deterrence and contributing to the country's already too heavy and
increasing burden of crime."'"
As might be expected from what has already been said, Professor
Waite was an implacable and outspoken opponent of the exclusionary
rule. Then, as now, he has had a lot of company." Among those who
have shared Waite's view are Chief Justice Burger and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Each has made arguments against the rule reminiscent of
those made by Professor Waite decades earlier. 2
Waite was quite familiar with the claims made by proponents of
the exclusionary rule: if illegally obtained evidence is excluded, police
overzealousness "will diminish and cease"; if illegally obtained
evidence is admitted, police misconduct "will flourish and increase."' 3
But he was highly skeptical: "It is a logical enough theory,
impregnable in the library."' 4 (I consider this one of the most
memorable statements ever made in the long debate over the
exclusionary rule.) 5
Thomas Davies has been a member of the University of Tennessee
law faculty since 1986. While he was an American Bar Foundation
project director, and prior to entering teaching, he published what is
widely regarded as the most careful and most balanced evaluation of
the exclusionary rule's effects on criminal law enforcement. 6 (A
9. Waite (1955), supra note 1, at 169.
10. Id. at 186 (emphasis omitted).
11. In an appendix to his dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 426-27 (1971), Chief Justice Burger lists fourteen books and articles expressing
"disenchantment with the exclusionary rule." Waite's 1944 and 1955 articles are among
those listed.
12. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Bivens, 403
U.S. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of stay).
13. Waite (1944), supra note 1, at 685.
14. Id. Of course, one can certainly say the same thing about "the theory" put forward
by opponents of the exclusionary rule: there are many ways to enforce the exclusionary rule
other than by excluding the evidence obtained in violation of it; the offending officer "might
have been resisted, or sued for damages, or even prosecuted for oppression." People v.
Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 586-87 (N.Y. 1926).
15. More generally, Waite complained about judicial rulings (or, as he put it, "judicial
legislation") "based upon incomplete information" and "formulated without realization of
its probable effects." Waite (1944), supra note 1, at 679, 685. He would find some kindred
spirits today. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Transparent Adjudication
and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000).
16. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.3 (c), at 58 (3d ed. 1996), so describing Davies, A Hard Look, supra note 6.
1823June 20021
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decade earlier, as a law student, Davies had published a much-cited
"critique" of empirical evaluations of the exclusionary rule.)17
It should be made plain that Davies' Michigan Law Review article
does not focus on the search and seizure exclusionary rule.18
Nevertheless, his "recovering [of the Fourth Amendment's] original
understanding from the historical sources"'9 and his discussion of how
dramatic changes in legal and social institutions turned out to
undercut the Framers' premises, make his article indispensable
reading (and re-reading) for anyone interested in the exclusionary rule
debate. While Davies' interest in search and seizure has never
wavered, one might say that, in turning to legal history, he has shifted
methodology as the course of the search and seizure debate has shifted
grounds. Although Davies has a Ph.D. in political science, he has no
formal training in history. His political science training and his
litigation experience, however, have given him a strong background in
digging out data and making sense of it. His 200-page Michigan Law
Review article is the result."
I. PROFESSOR WAITE'S ATTACK ON THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Judges of the federal courts and those in eighteen of the states
have evolved a policy of rebuking police who transgress [search and
seizure] limitations by reversing the convictions of criminals
discovered through the transgression. Any evidence of guilt so
obtained must, these courts insist, be suppressed and kept from the
knowledge of trialjuries ....
This odd procedure of exempting known criminals from
punishment as a means of keeping the police in order has been
17. See Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule:
A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 740
(1974).
18. The most noteworthy feature of Davies' article is probably his attack on the "near-
universal assumption that the first clause of the Fourth Amendment was meant to articulate
a broad reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard." Davies, supra note 2, at 591. Davies
maintains that "the Framers understood 'unreasonable searches and seizures' simply as a
pejorative label for the inherent illegality of any searches or seizures that might be made
under general warrants," id. at 551; " 'unreasonable' was derived from Sir Edward Coke's
earlier use of 'against reason' as a synonym for inherent illegality or unconstitutionality." Id.
at 555.
One does not have to agree with Davies on this point to find persuasive his explanation
of why the Framers did not mention or even think about a search and seizure exclusionary
rule, but why, considering the legal and social changes that have occurred with the passage
of time, there now is (and has long been) a compelling need for such a rule.
19. Id. at 552.
20. We can expect more ventures into legal history by Davies in the years ahead. His
newest article, almost as long as his Michigan article, is The Fictional Character of Law-and-
Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Historical Arrest
Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002).
1824 [Vol. 100:1821
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discussed, applauded, or condemned by many commentators.2"
Is the exclusionary rule procedure odd, clumsy or awkward? I
think not. When the defendant seeks to prevent the government from
using the fruits of police illegality, the protagonists are in place. This is
the occasion when the defendant has the maximum incentive to
challenge the police conduct and, if he is indigent - as some eighty
percent of criminal defendants are 22 - the services of court-appointed
counsel. Why make the alleged victim of police illegality start a new
proceeding in another court? Why require the criminal defendant to
look for a lawyer willing to bring a civil lawsuit, often without any fee,
against "a team of professional investigators and testifiers"?23 Why
make the criminal defendant look for a lawyer willing to run the risk
of antagonizing the police?24
As Professor Stuntz has observed:
One of the [exclusionary] rule's great virtues is its efficiency. Claims are
inexpensive to raise, and the facts on which they rest usually do not
involve much independent digging by defense counsel.
25
[The fact that the exclusionary rule is tied to criminal prosecutions]
ensures that lots of claims are raised, which in turn allows courts to serve
as reasonably good watchdogs for certain kinds of police misbehavior.
Using criminal litigation to regulate the police thus has enormous
administrative and remedial advantages. The point goes well beyond
search and seizure law - police interrogation is much more easily
monitored through Miranda claims than through damages actions.
Indeed, it goes well beyond the police. It is much easier to regulate
misbehavior in jury selection by reversing convictions than by
encouraging lawsuits by potential jurors; that is why our law uses
criminal litigation to protect not only defendants but jurors as well.26
It is worth remembering that American criminal procedure
"imposes procedural regulations on the criminal process by
21. Waite (1955), supra note 1, at 169-70 (citation omitted). Compare Chief Justice
Burger's view of the exclusionary rule: "A more clumsy, less direct means of imposing
sanctions is difficult to imagine." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (concurring
opinion). Consider, too, Akhil Reed Amar's statement that the Supreme Court "has
concocted the awkward and embarrassing remedy of excluding reliable evidence of criminal
guilt." Amar, First Principles, supra note 3, at 785.
22. Stuntz, Virtues and Vices, supra note 3, at 452.
23. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 430 (1974).
24. See id.
25. Stuntz, Virtues and Vices, supra note 3, at 453.
26. Id. at 455. Stuntz adds, however, that while suppression motions "may be cost-
effective, they are not costless." Id. at 453. In a world where many defense lawyers have
severely limited resources, the many suppression motions that are made "presumably
displace something else. The most obvious 'something else' is factual argument, argument
about the merits of the criminal charge." Id. at 453.
1825June 2002]
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constitutional command. '27 Why should Fourth Amendment litigation
be exempted from that process?
"The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values
which it advances," observed a distinguished Attorney General's
Committee forty years ago, "depends upon a constant, searching, and
creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at
all stages of the process. "28 In context, it is clear that the Committee
meant the criminal process. Because the danger is plain that a criminal
will destroy or hide evidence of his crime if given advance notice, we
must postpone an opportunity for a hearing on the issue. But why does
it follow that no meaningful challenge of the police action should be
permitted at any stage of the criminal process - not even long after
the suspect is in custody and the evidence is in the police station? This
would be the result if the exclusionary rule were to be abolished.
B. [J]udges have themselves imposed [a number of] narrowly
restrictive limitations on police activity. Then, having created these
limitations, they themselves undertake to assure police obedience to
them. To this end they ignore the possibility of direct action against
individual officers and proceed by indirection.29
To assume the ineffectiveness of direct action by suit against an
overzealous officer merely from the absence of such suits in appellate
court reports is unjustifiable; the relation of appeals to suits begun
depends too largely upon the nature of the action; these may be so
simple and successful as to provoke no appeal. That no guilty gun-
carrier has ever brought suit for damages may be conceded, he would
find small sympathy before a jury .... As for unlawful arrest of
innocent persons, the writer has seen overzealous policemen sweating
copiously in fear of results and has known judgments rendered
against them. If suits are not begun, it is far more likely that no real
damage was suffered than that suit would be unsuccessful."
27. U.S. ATr'y GEN.'S COMM. ON POVERTY & THE ADMIN. OF FED. CRIM. JUST.,
REPORT 11 (1963) (emphasis added). The Report is often called The Allen Report, after the
Chairman of the Committee, Professor Francis A. Allen. At the time Allen was a member of
the University of Chicago law faculty, but a short time later he became dean of the
University of Michigan Law School.
28. Id.
29. Waite (1955), supra note 1, at 169.
30. Waite (1944), supra note 1, at 692. "Moreover," added Waite, "it should not be
forgotten that civil action by the individual injured is not the only alternative for enforcing
observance of official obligations and limitations .... [C]ertainly [recalcitrant law
enforcement officers] could be subjected, as a practical manner, to proceedings instituted by
court prosecutors or district attorneys." Id. But it is now fairly clear, as a practicable matter,
that criminal prosecutions are not a viable alternative to the exclusionary rule. As Justice
1826 [Vol. 100:1821
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As Justice Frankfurter pointed out on one of the last occasions he
wrote about the pre-Miranda due process/"totality of the
circumstances"/"voluntariness" test for admitting confessions:
[I]n many of the cases in which the command of the Due Process Clause
has compelled us to reverse state convictions obtained by impermissible
methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the
truth of what the defendant had confessed. Despite such verification...
we were constrained to find that the procedures leading to [the
defendant's] conviction had failed to afford him that due process of law
which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.31
Why can't the criminal justice system make use of an involuntary
confession that is so impressively corroborated that there is no doubt
about its trustworthiness? The exclusion of a reliable confession, no
less than the exclusion of illegally seized evidence, directly serves only
to protect those from whom incriminating evidence has been obtained.
(Most victims of impermissible interrogation practices never do
confess or do not make a confession that "checks out.") Why, during
the three decades that the due-process voluntariness test reigned
supreme, did the courts, to use Professor Waite's words, "ignore the
possibility of direct actions against individual [police interrogators]
and [instead] proceed by indirection"?32
In theory at least - the same theory that opponents of the search
and seizure exclusionary rule are quick to invoke - permitting the use
of verifiable coerced confessions would not leave the guarantee against
oppressive or otherwise objectionable police interrogation methods
without alternative means of protection.
Potter Stewart once pointed out, "criminal sanctions are too great a penalty and too strong a
deterrent to effective law enforcement" to be applied whenever an officer negligently
violates the Fourth Amendment and, because "juries are inclined to credit the testimony" of
lawless police officers, "it is difficult to obtain a conviction for willful deprivation of fourth
amendment rights." Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1365, 1386-87 (1983).
31. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). For other emphatic statements of
what has been called the "police methods" test for the admissibility of confessions, see Lego
v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972) and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964). As
some commentators pointed out as early as Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), the
Court seemed to be applying a test for the admissibility of confessions that reflected less a
concern with the reliability of a particular confession than disapproval of police
interrogation methods considered offensive or subject to serious abuse. See Francis A. Allen,
The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV.
213, 233-37 (1959); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6
STAN. L. REV. 411,429 (1954).
32. Waite (1955), supra note 1, at 169. It will not do to point to the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. The pre-Miranda due process "voluntariness" doctrine was not
based on the self-incrimination clause and the courts that applied and developed the test did
so without regard to the privilege. It was not until 1964, that the privilege was deemed
applicable to the states, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and it was not until two years
later, when the Court handed down Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that the
privilege was held to apply to custodial interrogation.
June 20021 t827
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During the pre-Miranda era, various state laws made it a crime for
a police officer to deny a lawyer the opportunity to meet with a client
who had been arrested or to fail to notify a suspect's relatives that he
had been arrested.33 Other state laws penalized police officers who
sought to elicit confessions by violence or threats of violence.3 4
Furthermore, false imprisonment and assault are torts. Why were
these various "alternative remedies" insufficient?
Of course, the Court rejected or, so far as I am aware, never
seriously considered these "alternative approaches" to the coerced
confession problem. Indeed, so far as I am aware, no government
lawyer ever made the "alternative remedies" argument in this context.
If a confession had been obtained by police methods that rendered it
"involuntary" or "coerced" - and thus violated due process - it had
to be excluded, however verifiable. It was that simple. But why is it
not that simple when physical evidence is obtained in violation of due
process, when the police have violated a constitutional protection that
is "basic to a free society?"35
As most critics of the exclusionary rule have done in the past
seventy-five years, Professor Waite quotes from Benjamin Cardozo's
famous opinion in People v. Defore,36 the New York case that rejected
the exclusionary rule (when the states still had an option), which
argued that there was no shortage of alternatives to the exclusionary
rule: "The officer might have been resisted, or sued for damages, or
even prosecuted for oppression."37 If these tort remedies and other
alternatives to the exclusionary rule have been ineffective, one reason
33. For a sampling of such statutes, see Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion in
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 586-87 n.29 (1961).
34. See id. at 586 n.28.
35. Although it upheld Dr. Wolf's conviction in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
"the Court had apparently treated the police behavior [that turned up the evidence] in Wolf
as violating the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights; that is to say, 'rights basic to a
free society' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' had been invaded." Francis A.
Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 9.
Although the type of illegal search that occurred in Wolf is never discussed, it appears to
have been a "routine" rather than an "aggravated" one. See Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig
Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083,
1101-02 (1959); see also Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the Fourth Amendment: Why a
Real Due Process Test Should Replace the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993
U. ILL. L. REV. 261, 267 n.43 (best reading of Wolf is that it incorporated the Fourth
Amendment but not the exclusionary rule). Mapp v. Ohio, 397 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling
Wolf, held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fourth Amendment along with
the exclusionary rule.
36. 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926), quoted in Waite (1944), supra note 1, at 682, 683-84.
37. Defore, 150 N.E. at 587.
1828 [Vol. 100:1821
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is that, to use Professor Waite's words, "no real damage was
suffered."38 But there are other explanations as well.
Although Justice Potter Stewart was on the Supreme Court when
Mapp v. Ohio39 was decided, he did not address the question of
whether the federal exclusionary rule should be imposed on state
courts because he did not believe the question was properly before the
Court. n° A quarter-century later, however (shortly after he had retired
from the Court), Justice Stewart left no doubt that he agreed with the
Mapp majority's conclusion. Why? Because in the real world none of
the theoretical alternatives to the exclusionary rule amounted to
much:
In sum, the most "powerful" remedies, criminal prosecutions for willful
violation of the fourth amendment and actions for injunctions against
large-scale violations, are rarely brought and rarely succeed. [As for
damage actions, they are] expensive, time-consuming, not readily
available and rarely successful. As a result, the deterrent effect of these
actions can hardly be said to be great, since the prospect of a judgment
for money damages is extremely remote.
Taken together, the currently available alternatives to the exclusionary
rule satisfactorily achieve some, but not all, of the necessary functions of
a remedial measure. They punish and perhaps deter the grossest of
violations, as well as governmental policies that legitimate these
violations. They compensate some of the victims of the most egregious
violations. But they do little, if anything, to reduce the likelihood of the
vast majority of fourth amendment violations - the frequent
infringements motivated by commendable zeal, not condemnable malice.
For these violations, a remedy is required that inspires the police officer
to channel his enthusiasm to apprehend a criminal toward the need to
comply with the dictates of the fourth amendment. There is only one
such remedy - the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.41
We now know that these alternative remedies were woefully
ineffective. We now know that, Professor Waite's claim to the
contrary notwithstanding, very few, if any, overzealous police officers
38. Waite (1944), supra note 1, at 692. Consider Stuntz, Virtues and Vices, supra note 3,
at 449:
[T]here is a kind of damages case one does not see: the lawsuit challenging the search of a
suspect's automobile or briefcase or jacket pocket. Such suits are almost never filed, both
because the targets of the searches may be unattractive to juries ... and because neither
judges nor juries would award any significant sum of money to compensate for the fairly
trivial harm of having the trunk of one's car opened. Save for house searches, and not often
even there, Fourth Amendment damages claims tend not to involve searches at all. They
involve seizure of suspects, and they tend to challenge the violent way in which these
seizures were carried out. That means a damages system would probably focus, as current
Fourth Amendment damages litigation does focus, on police violence and illegal detention.
39. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (imposing the search and seizure exclusionary rule on the states
as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process).
40. Stewart, supra note 30, at 1368, 1389.
41. Id. at 1388-89 (emphasis added).
1829June 2002]
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sweat copiously over the prospect of being sued or prosecuted. How
do we know this? From the reaction of law enforcement officials,
thirty-five years after the Defore case, when the U.S. Supreme Court
imposed the search and seizure exclusionary rule on all states.
In fact, New York City Police Commissioner Michael Murphy
likened the Mapp case to a "tidal wave" and an "earthquake. 4 2 As the
commissioner recalled some years later:
I can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law enforcement
which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect as [Mapp] . .. . As the
then commissioner of the largest police force in this country I was
immediately caught up in the entire problem of reevaluating our
procedures, which had followed the Defore rule, and... creating new
polices and new instructions for the implementation of Mapp ....
[Decisions such as Mapp] create tidal waves and earthquakes which
require rebuilding of our institutions sometimes from their very
foundations upward. Retraining sessions had to be held from the very
top administrators down to each of the thousands of foot patrolmen and
detectives engaged in the daily basic enforcement function.43
Why did Mapp have "such a dramatic and traumatic effect"? Why
did it necessitate "retraining" from top to bottom? What was the old
search and seizure training like? Was there any? How does one
"implement" Mapp, a case that simply imposed a remedy for a
violation of a body of law the police were supposed to be obeying all
along?
What did the commissioner mean when he tried to defend his
department's disinterest in the law of search and seizure prior to Mapp
by noting that his department "had followed the Defore rule"? To be
sure, Defore permitted New York prosecutors to use illegally seized
evidence, but it did not - as the commissioner evidently believed -
allow the police to commit illegal searches. What better evidence is
there of the ineffectiveness of the existing alternatives to the
exclusionary rule than the police reaction to Mapp?
As Donald Dripps has observed, "[i]f effective civil remedies
carried the political appeal that would commend them to legislators,
those remedies would have forced the police to comply with the
42. See the quotation from Commissioner Michael Murphy set forth immediately below.
43. Michael Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The
Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 939, 941 (1966).
Those who believed or assumed that various alternatives to the search and seizure
exclusionary rule were adequate may have suffered an even greater blow when, unaware
that there was a reporter in the audience, New York City Deputy Police Commissioner
Leonard Reisman explained to a large group of detectives at a post-Mapp training session
why they had to learn the law of search and seizure at this late date in their careers: "[In the
past] nobody bothered to take out search warrants .... [T]he Supreme Court had ruled that
evidence obtained without a warrant - illegally if you will - was admissible in state courts.
So the feeling was, why bother?" Sidney E. Zion, Detectives Get a Course in Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1965, at 50.
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Amendment in the [years before] Mapp [and] Mapp would have
discomfited the police but little."'
It appears that, prior to Mapp, the police were not the only New
York law enforcement officials unfamiliar with and unconcerned
about the law of search and seizure. Professor Richard Uviller, a New
York prosecuting attorney when Mapp was handed down, recalled
that he quickly "cranked out a crude summary" of federal search and
seizure law just before the next state convention of district attorneys
took place and that he "had an instant runaway best seller. It was as
though we had made a belated discovery that the fourth amendment
applied in the State of New York."45 Uviller's last comment, I believe,
sums up the situation in New York before and after Mapp quite well.
The response of New York law enforcement officials to the
imposition of the search and seizure exclusionary rule was hardly
unique. When, six years earlier, in People v. Cahan,46 the California
Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule on its own initiative, the
reaction of the Los Angeles Chief of Police, William Parker, was quite
similar to the reaction his New York City counterpart would have
when Mapp came down. Chief Parker issued both a warning and a
promise:
[O]ur ability to prevent the commission of crimes has been greatly
diminished. The actual commission of a serious criminal offense will not
justify affirmative police action until such time as the police have armed
themselves with sufficient information to constitute "probable cause" for
an actual arrest.4
7
We will meticulously abide by... the Cahan case and subsequent cases
dealing with the exclusionary rule. The criminal will continue to benefit
and the law-abiding public will continue to pay the bill.4"
As long as the Exclusionary Rule is the law of California, your police will
respect it and operate to the best of their ability within the framework of
limitations imposed by that rule. We feel obligated to present the case
44 Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I
Go Down that Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C.L. REV. 1559, 1606 (1996).
45. H. Richard Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some
Constitutional Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 VAND. L. REV. 501,502 (1982).
46. 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
47. WILLIAM H. PARKER, PARKER ON POLICE 117 (O.W. Wilson ed., 1957) (excerpts
from a statement filed with the California Judiciary Subcommittee on Illegal Searches,
Seizures, and the Laws of Arrest, Jan. 1956).
48. Id. at 125 (excerpts from an address delivered at the Ebell Club, Los Angeles, Mar.,
1956).
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against this rule of evidence ... to speak of how it affects our ability to
protect you against the criminal army.49
Why, prior to Cahan, did Chief Parker permit his officers to take
"affirmative action" without bothering to arm themselves with
sufficient information to constitute "probable cause"? Why, prior to
Cahan, were Los Angeles police not "meticulously abiding" by state
and federal constitutional provisions regarding searches and seizures?
And why did Chief Parker promise that his officers would work within
the "framework of limitations" imposed by the law of search and
seizure only so long as "the Exclusionary Rule is the law of
California"? °
With the possible exception of Commissioner Murphy's comments
on the impact of Mapp, is there any more persuasive testimony of the
need for the exclusionary rule than Chief Parker's reaction to Cahan?
E
In his 1955 article, Professor Waite quotes from a letter to him
from then Dean of the University of California School of Criminology,
Orlando W. Wilson, who later would become Chief of the Chicago
Police Department. The letter, written shortly before the Cahan case
was decided, assures Waite that "[i]n respect of police training"
(including instruction on "legal restrictions imposed on the police for
the purpose of protecting individual rights"), not one of the states
whose courts exclude illegally seized evidence "equals two non-
exclusion states: California, the most progressive of all in police
training, and New York, an early leader in the field."'51 All I can say is
that Dean Wilson badly misled Professor Waite.
In addition to the statements made by Chiefs Murphy, Parker and
others quoted above, consider Chief Judge Roger Traynor's
explanation of why he (and his colleagues) became convinced of the
need for the exclusionary rule in California:
My misgivings about [the admissibility of illegally seized evidence] grew
as I observed that time after time [such evidence] was being offered and
admitted as a routine procedure. It became impossible to ignore the
corollary that illegal searches and seizures were also a routine procedure
subject to no effective deterrent .... It was one thing to condone an
occasional constable's blunder .... It was quite another to condone a
steady course of illegal police procedures that deliberately and flagrantly
violated the Constitution of the United States as well as the state
constitution."
49. Id. at 131.
50. Id.
51. Waite (1955), supra note 1, at 194 n.77.
52. Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 322.
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Consider, too, Edward Barrett's description of the state of affairs
in California before the Cahan decision was handed down. A
California (Berkeley) law professor at the time, Barnett was known to
be more sympathetic to the needs and interests of the police than most
academics. Therefore, his comments are especially stinging:
[Prior to the adoption of the exclusionary rule in California] the police
were under no substantial pressure to seek clarification of [the rules
governing arrest, search and seizure]. The issue of legality became crucial
so seldom that the police had, in effect, broad discretion in determining
the procedure to follow ....
[T]he California situation was most unsatisfactory .... The
possibilities of the situation improving appeared slight. Law enforcement
groups preferred the ambiguity of [ill-defined and] seldom litigated rules
and had no real incentive to take the risks involved in seeking legislative
action. And there was little evidence that other groups would take the
initiative. 53
E
Many police chiefs were too cautious (or too bewildered) to make
any comments regarding Mapp. But a young Philadelphia assistant
district attorney (and a future U.S. Senator), Arlen Specter, made it
clear that, in Pennsylvania too, tort remedies, criminal prosecutions
and internal police discipline had little or no effect. He announced
that Mapp had "revolutionized" police practice and prosecution
procedures in the many states that had been admitting illegally seized
evidence.54 Indeed, he went so far as to call Mapp "the most significant
event in criminal law since the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment."55
Mr. Specter, too, seemed to confuse the content of the law of
search and seizure (which proponents of the exclusionary rule need
not, and have not always, defended) with the exclusionary rule - a
remedy, a rule that "merely states the consequences of a breach of
53. Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches - A
Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL. L. REV. 565, 577, 587 (1955).
54. Arlen Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L.
REV. 4, 4 (1962) (emphasis added). As the New York City Police Commissioner had done,
one Pennsylvania judge likened Mapp to a natural disaster - a " 'hurricane' which 'swept
over our fair land last June.' " Id. at 4 (quoting Commonwealth v. One 1955 Buick Sedan,
198 Pa. Super. 133, 135 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962)). Another Pennsylvania judge, presumably not
a Michigan law school graduate, "was so surprised by the Mapp holding that he said it
applied only to Ohio so far as he was concerned until the Pennsylvania appellate courts told
him otherwise." Id. at 4-5.
55. Id. at 4.
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whatever principles might be adopted to control law enforcement
officers."56 Mr. Specter warned:
There can be no doubt that the Mapp decision has significantly
impaired the ability of the police to secure evidence to convict the
guilty....
The law abiding citizens who must walk on some Philadelphia streets
at two o'clock in the morning would doubtless prefer to be subjected to a
search, without any cause, and have the police do the same to the man
standing idly at a corner; but that cannot be done under Mapp.57
In Minnesota, however, the pattern of law enforcement responses
to imposition of the exclusionary rule was broken. Another future
U.S. Senator, and a future Vice President as well, Minnesota's young
Attorney General, Walter Mondale, reminded an assemblage of
distressed Minnesota officers that "[tihe language of the Fourth
Amendment is identical to the [search and seizure provision] of the
Minnesota State Constitution" and that "the Mapp case did not alter
one word of either the state or national constitutions."58 Mondale
continued:
[Mapp] does not reduce police powers one iota. It only reduces potential
abuses of power. The adoption of the so-called "exclusionary rule" does
not affect authorized police practices in any way. What was a legal arrest
before, still is. What was a reasonable search before still is ....
The very fact that these [post-Mapp search and seizure] institutes are
being held is eloquent testimony.., of the basic wisdom of the Court's
decision. We are doing today, because of the Court's ruling, what we
should have done all along. We are studying ways in which we can bring
our police methods and procedures into harmony with the constitutional
rights of the people we serve.59
What Mondale said, in effect, was that if the police feared that the
evidence they were acquiring in their customary manner would now
be excluded by the courts, they must have been unmindful of the so-
called alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule all these years and
they must have been violating the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure all along. That, I think, is the hard truth.
56. Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 255, 255 (1961) (written on the eve of Mapp).
57. Specter, supra note 54, at 42.
58. Walter Mondale, The Problem of Search and Seizure, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 1962,
at 16.
59. Id. at 16, 17.
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When, some twenty years ago, I engaged in an exclusionary rule
debate with Judge Malcolm Wilkey, he stunned me by blaming the
failure to develop meaningful alternatives to the exclusionary rule on
the exclusionary rule. The police "are not going to investigate and
discipline their own men, and thus sabotage prosecutions," he warned,
"[s]o long as we keep the rule."6° On the other hand, he predicted,
abolishing the exclusionary rule would lead to "experimentation" "in
the laboratories of our 51 jurisdictions" "with various possible
alternatives promising far more than the now discredited exclusionary
rule."'"
This argument has several flaws. First, the fear of "sabotaging"
criminal prosecutions in no way inhibits law enforcement
administrators from disciplining officers who conduct unlawful
searches that turn up nothing incriminating. Second, there are large
areas of police activity (such as illegal detentions and unnecessary
destruction of property) that do not produce any incriminating
evidence and thus do not result in criminal prosecutions. Whatever the
reason for the failure to discipline officers for misconduct in these
instances, it cannot be the existence of the exclusionary rule.
Opponents of the exclusionary rule seem to think that they make a
powerful argument against the rule when they point out that the rule
does not operate if there is no illegally seized evidence to exclude.62 Of
60. Malcolm Richard Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62
JUDICATURE 215, 218 (1978). At the time Wilkey was a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Judge Wilkey claimed that so long as the exclusionary rule was on the books, the
development of meaningful alternatives would be inhibited because, inter alia, utilization of
such alternatives would sabotage pending criminal prosecutions. Professor Amar blames
inadequate tort remedies on the exclusionary rule for another reason. He seems to say that
by "render[ing] the Fourth Amendment contemptible in the eyes of judges and citizens" the
exclusionary rule has caused the public to "lose respect for the Fourth Amendment" itself
and thus to lose interest in developing any effective remedy for its violation. Amar, supra
note 21, at 799. However, this argument "ignores history," as pointed out in Steiker, supra
note 3, at 849; it overlooks the fact that no meaningful alternative to the exclusionary rule
developed in any of the many states that admitted illegally seized evidence prior to Mapp.
See infra text accompanying note 65.
61. Wilkey, supra note 60, at 232. Chief Justice Burger was even more sanguine about
abolishing the exclusionary rule. A return to the days when illegally seized evidence was
admissible, he predicted, "would inspire a surge of activity towards providing some kind of
statutory remedy for persons injured by police mistakes or misconduct." Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Earlier, although forcefully attacking the
exclusionary rule, the Chief Justice had "hesitate[d] to abandon it until some meaningful
substitute is developed." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). I submit he was right the first time.
62. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent
Privacy Violations), 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 463-64 (1997) [hereinafter Amar,
Against Exclusion] ("If the police know you are innocent and just want to hassle you
because of your race, your sex, your politics, and the search - predictably - finds no
evidence, the exclusionary rule is no deterrent whatsoever. It is no help for you at all.").
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course it does not operate in such a situation. But why must it be an
either/or proposition? Nothing prevents the use of tort remedies
against the offending officers or police department sanctions against
them "simultaneously with the use of the exclusionary rule."63 After
all, as Kenneth Pye once observed, "[nlo proponent of the
exclusionary rule has suggested that it should act in isolation. '
Still another response to Judge Wilkey, as I noted at the time of
my debate with him, is to recall some modern history:
[F]or many decades, a majority of the states had no exclusionary rule but
none of them developed any meaningful alternative. Thirty-five years
passed between the time the federal courts adopted the exclusionary rule
and the time Wolf was decided in 1949, but none of the 31 states which
still admitted illegally seized evidence had established an alternative
method of controlling the police. Twelve more years passed before Mapp
imposed the rule on the state courts, but none of the 24 states which still
rejected the exclusionary rule had instituted an alternative remedy. This
half-century of post-Weeks "freedom to experiment" did not produce
any meaningful alternative to the exclusionary rule anywhere.65
A forceful critic of the exclusionary rule, Christopher Slobogin,
argues that the pre-Mapp failure to create tort remedies and other
"direct sanctions" as alternatives to the exclusionary rule is consistent
with the law prior to the 1960s, when there were "virtually no
remedies for any constitutional criminal rights . .*,,66 "Now,
however," he maintains, "Mapp has gotten people used to thinking
there should be a remedy for the Fourth Amendment. '67 This claim
would have been a good deal more plausible if it had been made one
or two years after Mapp rather than forty years later.68
Dissenting in the Bivens case, Chief Justice Burger urged Congress
to develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy, outlining in
some detail what such a remedy would look like.69 That was ten years
63. A. Kenneth Pye, Charles Fahy and the Criminal Law, 54 GEO. L.J. 1055, 1072
(1966).
64. Id.
65. Yale Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make
the Fourth Amendment More than "an Empty Blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337, 346 (1979)
(footnotes omitted).
66. Slobogin, supra note 3, at 445 n.369.
67. Id.
68. Moreover, it is not at all clear to me that, as Professor Slobogin asserts, people have
become accustomed to the view that there should be a remedy for a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. It strikes me that people have become accustomed to complaining about
criminals going free on "technicalities" without thinking, or caring much, about direct
sanctions on the police. Indeed, two footnotes after his earlier assertion, Slobogin recognizes
that "perhaps our society does not want full enforcement of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
445 n.371. Even that strikes me as an understatement.
69. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
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after the Mapp case and more than thirty years ago. In 1970 (Dallin
Oaks) 7° and in 1981 (Richard Posner),71 two more critics of the
exclusionary rule writing in the post-Mapp era, called attention to the
need for effective tort remedies against the police. Once again,
however, few, if any, lawmakers seemed to be listening.
About as many fortified tort remedies and other alternatives to the
exclusionary rule have been proposed in the forty years since Mapp
was decided as were proposed in the forty years before that landmark
case was handed down.72 Yet the success rate has been the same. Zero.
One exasperated critic of the exclusionary rule, the late Joseph
Grano, found it "difficult to believe that we are so intellectually
impoverished.., that we lack the capability of devising an effective
alternative approach [to the exclusionary rule]. '73 The problem,
however, is not a lack of imagination or intellectual capacity. Rather it
is a lack of political will.
As Tracey Maclin has reminded us,74 ever since the 1930s,
commentators have been underscoring the inadequacy of existing tort
remedies against transgressing police and proposing what are now
called "fortified" tort remedies.75 But nothing has come of any of these
proposals. Why should we expect similar proposals made in our day76
to fare any better?
70. Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665,756-57 (1970).
71. Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 49, 68.
72. See infra note 84.
73. Joseph D. Grano, Introduction - The Changed and Changing World of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 395, 413 (1989).
74. Maclin, supra note 3, at 60 n.289.
75. See Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3
U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (1936); William T. Plumb, Jr., Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24
CORNELL L.Q. 337 (1939). Even the 1955 proposals by Barrett, supra note 53, at 592-95, and
Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493
(1955), brand new when I entered teaching, are now almost a half-century old.
The overwhelming consensus is that, as they presently exist (and as they have long
existed), civil suits against transgressing police officers, criminal prosecutions against them,
internal police discipline, and review boards are woefully inadequate remedies. The classic
article is Foote, supra. For the more recent literature, see Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 378-
79, 429-30; Maclin, supra note 3, at 59-65; Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional
Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys
General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 284-86 (1988); Pierre J. Schlag, Assaults on the
Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 875, 907-13 (1982); and William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment
Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1386-1410 (1981).
76. See infra note 84; see also infra text accompanying note 86.
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Is there any reason to think that today's or tomorrow's politicians
are, or will be, any less afraid of being called "soft on crime" or any
more interested in protecting people under investigation by the police
than the politicians of any other generation?77 Is there any basis for
believing that the lawmakers of our day are any more ready and
willing than their predecessors to invigorate tort remedies (or
administrative or criminal remedies) against the police for the benefit
of "criminals" or those suspected of being criminals?"
A dramatic illustration of the political power possessed by the
police and their allies appears in a new book by Welsh White. After
many allegations that a police commander (John Burge) and the
detectives who worked under him had been "torturing" suspects into
confessing, the Chicago police department finally became convinced
that at least some of these charges were true.79 To make matters
worse, ten Illinois prisoners on death row (known as the "death row
ten" or the "John Burge ten") maintained that Commander Burge and
his men had resorted to torture in extracting confessions from them,
too.8
"In the wake of the controversy surrounding the [aforementioned]
torture cases," reports Professor White, "the Illinois legislature
considered and at one point seemed inclined toward adopting a statute
that would require the police to video- or audiotape interrogations of
suspects in most cases."'" What happened?
77. "If anything," observes Steiker, "the escalating public hysteria over violent crime
from the 1960s through the present makes it even more 'politically suicidal' today to support
restrictions on police behavior than it was before 1961." Steiker, supra note 3, at 850
(footnote omitted). The quoted phrase comes from Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 379:
"[Tlhere will remain more than enough crime and fear of it in American society to keep our
legislatures from the politically suicidal undertaking of police control."
See also SASHA ABRAMSKY, HARD TIME BLUES: How POLITICS BUILT A PRISON
NATION 205 (2002): "[B]y the mid-1990s... the politics around crime and drug abuse had
been largely reduced to a battle of sound bites: who could successfully communicate their
toughness to voters clamoring for harsher punishments."
78. Too many politicians (and lay persons, too), I am afraid, share former Attorney
General Edwin Meese's view that "the thing is, you don't have many suspects who are
innocent of a crime .... If a person is innocent of a crime, then he is not a suspect." Susan
Bandes, "We the People" and Our Enduring Values, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1376, 1379 (1998)
(book review) (omission in original) (quoting Reagan Seeks Judge with "Traditional
Approach," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 15, 1985, at 67).
79. WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS 128-36 (2001). As the result
of a civil lawsuit brought by one of Burge's victims, a police investigator looked into charges
against the commander and concluded that for a period of more than ten years, he and the
detectives under him had used abusive interrogation practices. Id. at 130. In 1993, after a
police board determined that Burge had tortured the person who brought the lawsuit against
him, the commander was dismissed from the police force. Id.
By "torture," I mean suffocating a suspect with a typewriter cover, administering an
electric shock to his genitals, hanging him by handcuffs for several hours, and playing
"Russian roulette" with a police weapon in the suspect's mouth. Id. at 129.
80. Id. at 130-31.
81. Id. at 136.
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"Before the bill could be passed," the "law enforcement
community" made plain its opposition. "Among other things," it
issued a "Legislative Alert" claiming that "mandatory videotaping
provides new 'hoops and hurdles' for law enforcement and 'reflects
major expansion of the rights of the accused at the expense of crime
victims, public safety and law enforcement.' "82 The result? The bill's
sponsors declined "to introduce it for a vote by the full House of
Representatives."83
Illegal arrests and unlawful searches and seizures are typically less
often characterized by violence and brutality than are impermissible
police interrogation methods. Therefore, lawless arrests and searches
are less likely to attract the press or arouse the community.
(Moreover, unlike the Chicago torture cases, violations of the Fourth
Amendment do not raise doubts about a defendant's innocence.) If
the law enforcement community can squelch legislative reform efforts
in the confessions area as peremptorily as it did in the wake of the
Burge scandal, how much trouble will the police have defeating search
and seizure proposals that impose direct sanctions on them?
Nevertheless, new legislative proposals for direct sanctions against
lawless police, e.g., tort remedies, administrative remedies, internal
disciplinary systems, keep coming (usually accompanied by a sharp
attack on the desirability and efficacy of the exclusionary rule).84
Christopher Slobogin's proposal, worthy of note because it is the
subject of a long, well-written, heavily documented article,85 is
illustrative. At one point, Professor Slobogin states:
82. Id. (footnote omitted). Why videotaping of police interrogation of suspects would
greatly expand suspects' rights and how such videotaping would impair public safety was not
made clear.
83. Id. (footnote omitted).
84. See, e.g., Amar, First Principles, supra note 3, at 811-16; Randy E. Barnett, Resolving
the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32
EMORY L.J. 937, 969-80 (1983); Robert Batey, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations
Through Police Disciplinary Reform, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 245, 252-56 (1976); Robert P.
Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939
(1982); L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule,
83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 743-54 (1998).
Perhaps the most interesting proposal in recent years is one by Donald Dripps, "that
courts should begin to experiment with suppression orders that are contingent on the failure
of the police department to pay damages set by the court." Donald Dripps, The Case for the
Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2001). According to Professor
Dripps, the damages should be set so as to "leave the government indifferent between
exclusion and damages in the ordinary case, yet still free to pay the damages when the
illegality turns up an exceptionally culpable or dangerous crime." Id. at 3. However, I share
the view of George C. Thomas III, that "[j]udges trained in the common law method are
unlikely to take it upon themselves to adopt such a complex, legislative-type, global solution
to a so-far unyielding problem" and are unlikely to be "institutionally capable of crafting the
discerning solution that Dripps envisions." George C. Thomas III, Judges Are Not
Economists and Other Reasons to be Skeptical of Contingent Suppression Orders: A
Response to Professor Dripps, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 47, 48 (2001).
85. Slobogin, supra note 3.
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[A] regime that directly sanctions officers and their departments is
preferable to the [exclusionary] rule. Although there are many versions
of such a regime, it should have several core components: (1) a liquidated
damages/penalty for all unconstitutional actions, preferably based on the
average officer's salary; (2) personal liability, at the liquidated damages
sum, of officers who knowingly or recklessly violate the Fourth
Amendment; (3) entity liability at the liquidated damages sum, for all
other violations; (4) state-paid legal assistance for those with Fourth
Amendment claims; and (5) a judicial decisionmaker.86
To his credit, Professor Slobogin recognizes that his scheme may
not be politically feasible:
There is no doubt that the proposed system would be expensive ....
Attorneys for both sides would have to be paid and a special bench
would have to be created. Police departments would be accountable for
damages and would incur costs in improving training programs and
increasing job qualification requirements. Departments might also have
to spend more on salaries, if fear of liability drives some applicants
away.87
When I think about Professor Slobogin's proposal for a formidable
tort remedy against transgressing police, I am reminded of Donald
Dripp's comment about a similar legislative proposal: "Who would be
in favor of such legislation? Law professors and civil libertarians. Who
would oppose it? Any politician who wants to be seen as a friend of
the police."88
Suppose Congress were to enact a tort remedy that included many
features of Professor Slobogin's proposal. Suppose, for example, that
such legislation would provide state-paid legal assistance for all
persons who claim their "right to be secure" was violated by the
police; nontrivial liquidated damages for all violations of the Fourth
Amendment (say $10,000 or $15,000 for every illegal arrest and
86. Id. at 442.
87. Id. at 444. Slobogin is well aware that surveys of the police indicate that they prefer
the exclusionary rule over a damages remedy, police department sanctions, or other forms of
direct sanction. Id. at 392. He assumes this is so because the exclusionary rule "imposes the
fewest restrictions on their actions." Id. But it may be more complicated than that.
Some twenty years after Mapp, Milton Loewenthal (who taught police officer students
at John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York at the time)
conducted what I believe is the most comprehensive study of police attitudes toward the
exclusionary rule. Professor Loewenthal interviewed many police officers on all levels as
well as many of his own police officer students. According to Professor Loewenthal, the
police "have great difficulty believing that standards can have any real meaning if the
government can profit from violating them." Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REV. 24, 39 (1980). Moreover,
Loewenthal found "strong evidence that, regardless of the effectiveness of direct sanctions,
police officers could neither understand nor respect a Court which purported to impose
constitutional standards on the police without excluding evidence obtained in violation of
those standards." Id. at 29.
88. Dripps, supra note 44, at 1619.
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$25,000 or $35,000 for every unlawful search of the home); and thirty-
five or forty percent of the offending officer's annual salary for each
and every intentional or reckless violation of the Amendment he
committed. 9 Suppose, in short, Congress enacted a perfect tort
remedy or one as perfect as could be (from the point of view of the
victim of police misconduct at any rate). Would I go along with
abolition of the exclusionary rule in favor of such a remedy?
I cannot help recalling how the late Charles Black responded when
asked whether he would withdraw his opposition to the death penalty
if he were sure that the system of capital punishment "were being
administered with perfect fairness."' That, replied Professor Black, is
like asking me: "Would you take trains if the earth were made flat, or
would you fear that they would run off the edge?"91
89. Id. at 1618-19. Professor Dripps may not be willing to call a tort remedy against the
police a perfect one unless it includes a provision that "either party may introduce polygraph
evidence and the failure of the opposing party to introduce such evidence." Id. at 1619.
90. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Death Penalty Now, 51 TUL. L. REV. 429, 445 (1977).
91. Id. This was not Professor Black's complete answer to the question he has often
been asked. (He made it clear he would still be opposed to capital punishment.) Nor is it the
complete answer to the question I have sometimes been asked.
After pinching myself a few times, to make sure I wasn't dreaming, I would applaud the
enactment into law of the "perfect tort remedy" against offending police officers. I would
also support the enactment of Professor Slobogin's plan, which looks quite promising. I
would be willing to replace the exclusionary rule with the new legislation in most instances.
As Professor Slobogin himself prefers, however, I would want to retain the exclusionary rule
for flagrant or egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment. See Slobogin, supra note 3, at
440-41.
I should add that I have little doubt that the present Court would uphold a federal
statute adopting Professor Slobogin's proposal as an adequate alternative to the
exclusionary rule. The Court that decided Mapp seemed to consider the search and seizure
exclusionary rule a constitutional requirement. See Allen, supra note 35, at 23-24, 26; Yale
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather
than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 623-27 (1983) [hereinafter
Kamisar, Exclusionary Rule]; Schlag, supra note 75, at 884-86. The post-Warren Court,
however, no longer does. See especially United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also LAFAVE, supra note 16, at 21-
22; Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1048-49
(2001). The exclusionary rule must now be regarded as a "prophylactic rule" or a first cousin
to prophylactic rules like Miranda. Professors LaFave, Israel, and King put it in the
"prophylactic rule" category, i.e., describe it as a "prophylactic remedial measure." WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.9(e) at 674-
75 (2d ed. 1999). Professor Klein calls the search and seizure exclusionary rule a
" 'constitutional incidental right,' a judicially-created procedure determined by the Court as
the appropriate relief for the violation of an explicit or 'true' constitutional rule or a
prophylactic rule." Klein, supra, at 1033. These commentators may differ about the label, but
they agree that Congress is free to replace the exclusionary rule with a suitable substitute.
Professor Slobogin seems to think that there is no harm in calling for the abolition of the
exclusionary rule, and bashing it in the process, so long as its abolition is conditioned on
enactment of an effective alternative remedy. I am not at all sure.
As Susan Bandes has pointed out, a member of Congress (or a state legislator, or a
Supreme Court Justice for that matter) may not realize, or may not care, that an article or a
speech (or testimony before a Senate committee) strongly criticizing the exclusionary rule
was accompanied by a fortified tort remedy or administrative remedy designed to take the
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C. One does not happily charge the judiciary with responsibility
for the country's burden of crime, but the responsibility does in fact
exist. Judges, though they may not encourage crime, interfere with its
prevention in various ways. They deliberately restrict police
efficiency in the discovery of criminals. They exempt from
punishment many criminals who are discovered and whose guilt is
evident.92
Professor Waite was hardly the only critic of the exclusionary rule
who asserted or assumed that the rule had a large impact on the
apprehension and conviction of criminals. Chief Justice Warren
Burger maintained that "this Draconian" remedy exacts "exorbitant
costs from society'"93 and results in "the release of countless guilty
criminals."94 And future Chief Justice Rehnquist viewed Mapp as a
case that "brought to bear in favor of accused murderers and armed
rule's place. Bandes, supra note 78, at 1407. The Congressman, state legislator, or Supreme
Court Justice may be much more interested in, or impressed by, the attack on the rule than
on the need for a meaningful alternative.
As Tracy Maclin has noted, Wigmore was only the first in a line of commentators who
attacked the exclusionary rule, but then professed "his love and affection for the Fourth
Amendment by proposing a remedy that would never materialize in the real world." Maclin,
supra note 3, at 55. Unfortunately, most of us seem to remember various commentators'
assaults on the exclusionary rule a good deal better than we do the alternative remedies
these commentators offered in its place.
Every student of the Fourth Amendment is familiar with Wigmore's attack on the
exclusionary rule. See John H. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and
Seizure 8 A.B.A. J. 479 (1922). Few, however, know - and still fewer take seriously - the
alternative remedy he offered: send for the overzealous police officer and send him to jail for
thirty days for "contempt of the Constitution." Id. at 484. (Imagine the uproar if three or
four officers were sent to jail for "contempt of the Constitution." Imagine how many judges
who have to run for re-election would avail themselves of this remedy.)
Some people probably still remember Judge Wilkey's forceful attack on the exclusionary
rule. See Wilkey, supra note 60. But how many remember, or take seriously, the alternative
remedy he proposed? I debated him some twenty years ago, and I did not remember what
alternative he offered. I had to look it up: a "mini-trial" of the offending police officer, one
that would take place after the main criminal case. Id. at 231.
Perhaps the most widely-cited attack on the exclusionary rule - and it is a scathing
attack - is Dallin Oaks' article. See Oaks, supra note 70. This article is almost always cited
for its multi-faceted criticism of the exclusionary rule, but almost never for its word of
caution about getting rid of the rule. Very few people remember, if they ever knew, that on
the next-to-last-page of his ninety-two-page article Professor Oaks warns that "[d]espite [its]
weaknesses and disadvantages, the exclusionary rule should not be abolished until ... [it is]
replaced by an effective tort remedy." Id. at 756. Oaks was well aware that no such remedy
existed at the time, but he discussed various ways in which such a remedy could be made
more effective. An effective tort remedy, he pointed out, a decade after Mapp - and more
than thirty years ago - is "long overdue." Id. at 757.
92. Waite (1955), supra note 1, at 169.
93. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
94. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
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robbers a rule which had previously largely had an application to
bootleggers and purveyors of stolen lottery tickets."95
In his much-discussed 1994 assault on the exclusionary rule, Akhil
Amar, too, implies that the rule has a considerable adverse impact on
police efforts to bring murderers and other violent criminals to book.
In one two-and-a-half page segment alone, Professor Amar asks or
discusses six times whether "the murderer's bloody knife" or "the
bloody knife" should be admitted into evidence or excluded and
whether it "would have come to light anyway."96 Immediately
thereafter, working with another hypothetical, Amar discusses
whether Bob's "bloodstained shirt" should be "introduced as evidence
in Bob's murder trial."97
"The most careful and balanced assessment conducted to date of
all available empirical data,"98 is a study by Thomas Davies that
indicates that "the general level of the rule's effects on criminal
prosecutions is marginal at most."99 The impact of the rule is greater
95. California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 927 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of stay) (emphasis added). More recently, another critic of the exclusionary rule,
Judge Stephen Markman, has declared it "indisputable that considerable numbers of people
have been murdered, raped, assaulted and terrorized as a direct result of the exclusionary
rule." Stephen J. Markman, Six Observations on the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 425, 432-33 (1997).
96. Amar, First Principles, supra note 3, at 793-95.
97. Id. at 795-98. Professor Amar mentions "Murderer Bob" or his "bloodstained shirt"
three times in a four-page segment.
98. LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 1.3(c), at 58 (praising Professor Davies' study).
99. Davies, A Hard Look, supra note 6, at 622 (emphasis omitted).
Twelve years after he published his study on the "costs" of the exclusionary rule,
Professor Davies told the Senate Judiciary Committee that if the research he had done in the
1980s "were repeated today, there is every reason to think that the 'lost arrest' rate would be
even lower, because search law has been relaxed even further since that date." The Jury and
the Search for the Truth: Hearing on S.3 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., 143 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Professor Thomas Davies). Davies
told the committee that "[t]he Court ha[d] made it extremely easy for police to claim the
victim of a search 'consented' to it - which is undoubtedly the ground that accounts for the
largest number of legal searches." Id. at 141. Citing, inter alia, California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988) (police examination of sealed garbage bags placed on curb for pickup, not a
"search"), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (observations from police helicopter
hovering over fenced-in backyard not a "search"), Davies noted that the Court had
narrowed what police activity constituted a "search" and thus what police activity had to
comply with the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 141. For other examples of what Davies
called "police-friendly" or "government-friendly" Supreme Court decisions in recent years,
see id. at 141-43. See also the discussion of "bright-line" or "safe harbor" rules, infra note
114.
If Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that the police can stop a
motorist where there are adequate grounds to believe some traffic violation has occurred,
even though the stop is pretextual), had been decided a year earlier, I venture to say that
Professor Davies would have focused on that case in his testimony. As William J. Stuntz
recently observed:
In a world ... where routine traffic offenses count as crimes, the requirement of probable
cause to arrest may mean almost nothing. Officers can arrest for a minor offense -
everyone violates the traffic rules - in order to search or question a suspect on a major one.
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for particular crimes, such as felony drug offenses, "the prosecution of
which depends heavily on physical evidence."'" Indeed, "[t]he most
striking feature of the data is the concentration of illegal searches in
drug arrests (and possibly weapons possession arrests) and the
extremely small effects in arrests for other offenses, including violent
crimes."'' 1 For example, "[t]he statewide California data show that less
than 0.3% (fewer than three in 1000) of arrests for all nondrug
offenses are rejected by prosecutors because of illegal searches, and
there are even smaller effects for the most serious violent crimes."102
The data also reveals that the exclusion of murderers' and rapists'
"bloody knives" and "bloodstained shirts" is an exceedingly rare
event: according to a five-year study of California data, illegal search
and seizure problems were given as the reason for the rejection of only
thirteen of more than 14,000 forcible rape arrests (0.09%) and only
eight of approximately 12,000 homicide arrests (0.06%).103 A nine-
county, three-state study, involving some 7,500 cases, disclosed that
"[n]one of the motions [to exclude evidence] granted.., involved
exceptionally serious cases such as murder, rape, armed robbery, or
even unarmed robbery."' 4
This allows arrests and searches of suspected drug dealers without any ex ante support for
the suspicion, the very thing the probable cause standard is supposed to forbid.
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1997).
100. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984).
101. Davies, A Hard Look, supra note 6, at 680. Davies estimates, on the basis of
available data, that "the cumulative loss of drug arrests at all stages of felony processing in
California is around 7.1%." Id. at 681. In Leon, the Court states that "the cumulative loss
due to nonprosecution... of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is probably in the
range of 2.8% to 7.1%." 468 U.S. at 907 n.6.
102. Davies, A Hard Look, supra note 6, at 619.
103. See id. at 640, 645. One may contend, as did Justice White for the Court in United
States v. Leon, that the small percentages of cases lost because of the exclusionary rule "mask
a large absolute number." 468 U.S. at 908 n.6 (emphasis added). But "raw numbers are not
as useful for policy evaluation as percentages. In a system as large as the American criminal
justice system ... almost any nationwide measurement or estimate will look large if
expressed in raw numbers." Davies, A Hard Look, supra note 6, at 670.
Moreover, what about cases lost for other reasons? Professor Dripps may have
overstated the point somewhat, but not, I think, by very much when he observed: "For every
prosecution aborted by the constitutional exclusionary rules, roughly a hundred founder
because of numbingly prosaic procedural problems. The guilty go free primarily because
justice takes too long and because the witnesses do not testify when the trial finally occurs."
Donald Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified
Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 634-35 (1990).
104. Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical
Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 596 n.47 (emphasis added). (The three states
were Illinois, Michigan and Pennsylvania.); see also Maclin, supra note 3, at 44. Consider,
too, the testimony of E. Michael McCann, district attorney of Milwaukee, before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Mr. McCann told the Committee that although he had been the
district attorney of Milwaukee for twenty-seven years, during which time he had "been
involved in tens of thousands of prosecutions," he could not recall a single "murder case -
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Although he offered many reasons for scrapping the exclusionary
rule, Dallin Oaks refused to make one argument against the rule -
that (to use a term popular at the time) the rule "handcuffs" the police
in their pursuit of criminals:
The whole argument about the exclusionary rule "handcuffing" the
police should be abandoned. If this is a negative effect, then it is an effect
of the constitutional rules, not an effect of the exclusionary rule as the
means chosen for their enforcement. Police officials and prosecutors
should stop claiming that the exclusionary rule prevents effective law
enforcement. In doing so they attribute far greater effect to the
exclusionary rule than the evidence warrants, and they are also in the
untenable position of urging that the sanction be abolished so that they
can continue to violate the rules with impunity. °5
I consider it noteworthy that Professor Oaks, the author of one of
the most powerful attacks on the exclusionary rule, made what is in
essence one of the favorite arguments of the rule's supporters. This
argument, which has been called "[t]he classic response" of the rule's
defenders,0 6 was well stated more than sixty years ago:
indeed, a homicide case -. .. that we lost because of the fourth amendment." Hearings,
supra note 99, at 97-98 (Statement of E. Michael McCann).
The impact of the exclusionary rule may be negligible in rape, homicide and other
violent crime cases because Fourth Amendment problems rarely arise in such cases or
because the police make special efforts to satisfy prescribed search and seizure standards in
such cases. To a considerable, but unknown extent, however, the negligible effects of the
exclusionary rule in these types of cases may reflect the reluctance of judges to grant the
suppression motions of "serious criminals." Stephen Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE
L.J. 1405, 1408 n.33 (1986).
A decade ago, Myron Orfield interviewed some forty Chicago criminal court judges,
public defenders and prosecuting attorneys. He reported that in a "heater case," "a big case
that has the potential to arouse public ire if the defendant goes free" for a violation of the
Fourth Amendment - the "quintessential heater is a murder case" - the elected judge is
under enormous pressure to admit evidence obtained in an illegal search and will always, or
almost always, find a way to do so. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the
Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
75, 115-22 (1992). In Chicago (and undoubtedly in other places as well), most judges, at least
those who have to run for reelection, seem to have unofficially adopted the substance of
John Kaplan's proposal: carve out an exception to the exclusionary rule for "treason,
espionage, murder, armed robbery and kidnapping by organized groups." John Kaplan, The
Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046 (1974). I consider this an
unfortunate development for reasons I have spelled out elsewhere. See Yale Kamisar,
"Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Kamisar, Comparative Reprehensibility]. But see Stuntz, Virtues
and Vices, supra note 3, at 447:
[Tjhe visibility of the criminal who walks away [because of the exclusionary rule] has an
important benefit: it makes courts see the consequences of the constitutional rules they
create for the police. The exclusionary rule is... a way of limiting counter-majoritarian
excess. Judges who write rules that prevent the capture of the occasional rapist are forced to
see an occasional rapist walk away as a result of those rules. And the rest of us can see it,
too. That may serve to rein in overly aggressive judicial lawmakers.
105. Oaks, supra note 70, at 754.
106. Amar, First Principles, supra note 3, at 793.
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I have no fear that the exclusionary rule will handicap the detection or
prosecution of crime. All the arguments that have been made on that
score seem to me to be properly directed not against the exclusionary
rule but against the substantive guarantee itself .... It is the rule, not the
sanction, which imposes limits on the operation of the police. If the rule
is obeyed as it should be, and as we declare it should be, there will be no
illegally obtained evidence to be excluded by operation of the sanction. 0 7
Akhil Amar, however, rejects the argument that setting criminals
free is a cost of the Fourth Amendment itself, not the exclusionary
rule. "Suppose," he responds, "the police could easily get a warrant,
but fail to do so" and "the court goes on to exclude the bloody
knife."' 8 "The police could easily have obtained a warrant before the
search, so the illegality is not a but-for cause of the introduction of the
knife into evidence."' 09
First of all, the case Professor Amar poses will not, as he asserts,
arise "in many situations.""' The government will almost never lose
evidence for its failure to obtain a warrant because it almost never
needs a warrant to conduct a search and it almost never uses one.
"[Allthough more frequent than in pre-Mapp days, obtaining a search
107. Statement of U.S. Senator Robert F. Wagner, 1 NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, REVISED RECORD 560 (1938). For an even earlier statement of this
argument, see Connor Hall, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment, 8 A.B.A. J. 646 (1922).
For other versions of the same basic argument, see, e.g., Allen, supra note 35, at 34; Kamisar,
Comparative Reprehensibility, supra note 104, at 47-48; and Stewart, supra note 30, at 1393.
108. Amar, First Principles, supra note 3, at 794.
109. Id. Although he is not happy about it, Professor Amar recognizes that the
"inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to the situation he
poses. See id. at 794 n.137; Amar, Against Exclusion, supra note 62, at 462. Judge Frank
Easterbrook put it well, I think, when he observed that in a situation where the police have
probable cause, but do not, as they should, obtain a warrant, "what makes a discovery
'inevitable' is not probable cause alone ... but probable cause plus a chain of events that
would have led to a warrant (or another justification) independent of the search." United
States v. Brown, 64 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 1995). Otherwise, adds Judge Easterbrook, "the
requirement of a warrant for a residential entry will never be enforced by the exclusionary
rule." Id.
The "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of
unlawfully obtained evidence if it "ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (emphasis added). The exception
does not apply simply because the police could have or might have obtained the evidence
lawfully - simply because "the police had the capacity (which they did not exercise)" to
proceed lawfully. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 9.3(e), at 354 (2d ed. 1999) (emphasis added). As the Court, per Justice
Scalia, recently observed:
The fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does not
make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment. The police might, for
example, learn how many people are in a particular house by setting up year-round
surveillance; but that does not make breaking and entering to find out the same information
lawful.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J.)
110. Amar, First Principles, supra note 3, at 794.
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warrant is still a relatively rare phenomenon";1" "the vast majority of
searches are now conducted without a warrant, yet they are regularly
declared 'reasonable' by the Court.""1 2  One category alone,
warrantless searches incident to arrest, "outnumber[s] manyfold
searches covered by warrants."'' 3 In recent decades, "bright-line" rules
in favor of the police (sometimes called "safe harbor" rules),
especially in the context of automobiles, have further reduced the
need for search warrants - indeed, have exempted from the warrant
requirement virtually all searches outside of homes and offices. 4
In most of the relatively few cases that illegally seized evidence is
excluded, then, it will be because the police lacked sufficient
information to make the search in the first place. So most of the time
that illegally seized evidence is thrown out the basic point of the
exclusionary rule's defenders is valid: the search should not have
occurred in the first place - and would not have occurred if the police
had obeyed the Fourth Amendment in the first place.
Moreover, posing a hypothetical case where the police "could
easily have obtained a warrant, but fail[ed] to do so" is one thing;
applying this hypothetical to the real world is something else. It will
often be unclear whether police who have acted without a warrant
could have obtained a warrant if they had applied for one. The fact
that a judge is prepared to uphold a search after it has turned up
incriminating evidence does not necessarily mean that a magistrate
would have issued a warrant before the search was made. (In some
instances it may not even mean that an officer thought he had enough
111. RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 17 (Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, 1984).
112. Klein, supra note 91, at 1038; see also VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 111, at 19.
113. TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 48
(1969). And the percentage of arrests made pursuant to an arrest warrant is astonishingly
small. For example, five years after Mapp, of 171,288 arrests made by the New York City
police, "only 366 were made pursuant to an arrest warrant." MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary at 493 n.5 (Official Draft 1975).
114. See Dripps, supra note 44, at 1607-08; William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth
Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 921-22 (1991) [hereinafter Stuntz, Warrants]; see
also in chronological order, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (holding that police
do not need a warrant to search a car even though driver is in custody and car is
immobilized); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that as part of valid
search incident to defendant's arrest, police may conduct warrantless search of containers in
defendant's possession); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that police may
conduct warrantless search of entire passenger compartment of arrested driver's car); United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that where police have probable cause to believe
that a car contains a controlled substance, they may conduct a warrantless search of entire
vehicle, including trunk and containers found within vehicle); and California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 385 (1991) (holding that when police have probable cause to believe that a particular
container in the vehicle (as opposed to the entire vehicle) contains contraband or evidence
of crime, they may conduct warrantless search of particular container). "Safe harbor" rules,
such as those cited above, in effect "permit searches without warrants that might be
,unreasonable' on their particular facts." Klein, supra note 91, at 1045.
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information to apply for a warrant.) "It must be much harder for a
judge to decide that an officer had something less than probable cause
to believe cocaine was in the trunk of a defendant's car when the
cocaine was in fact there." '115
Moreover, the fact that the application for a warrant is granted or
rejected "before the officer knows what he will find in the place to be
searched ... makes perjury somewhat harder, since the officer cannot
so easily manufacture details consistent with a story he does not yet
know.. 1 6 One reason it is desirable for the police to seek warrants is
that "they make officers record what they know before the search
takes place, and thus make it harder for them to lie about what they
knew when they testify at suppression hearings."' 17
Almost all critics of the exclusionary rule assure us that they want
to replace it with an effective "direct remedy" (such as a tort action
against the offending officer, a criminal prosecution, or internal police
discipline). The question, therefore, is not whether establishing the
exclusionary rule would eliminate the so-called costs of the rule (guilty
people going unpunished), but whether an alternative remedy would
exact fewer "costs" than the exclusionary rule does. Professor Stuntz's
observations should give proponents of alternative remedies pause to
think again:
[T]he usual legal tools - damages, fines, criminal punishment - are
likely to cause more harm than good if they are widely used. If an officer
faces serious loss whenever he makes a bad arrest, he will make fewer
bad arrests, but also many fewer good ones. The same is true, only more
115. Stuntz, Warrants, supra note 114, at 912, 913; see also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (quoting with approval from Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964))
(Bypassing the warrant procedure " 'substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an
after-the-event justification for the . .. search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the
familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.' ").
116. Stuntz, Warrants, supra note 114, at 915 (emphasis omitted). A study of the
Chicago criminal justice system discloses that "[j]udges and public defenders perceive
perjury to be the major factor limiting the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] rule."
Orfield, supra note 104, at 98. Nevertheless, most people interviewed "believe that the
exclusionary rule has dramatically improved police behavior and should be retained ....
Today, while police often perjure themselves, they also, because of the exclusionary rule,
often obey the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 132; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Fourth
Amendment Remedies. The Current Understanding, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL
MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 197,199 (Eugene W. Hickok ed., 1991).
117. Stuntz, Warrants, supra note 114, at 925. Not only is it easier for an officer who
made a search without a warrant to lie at the suppression hearing (because he knows the
objective evidence before he testifies), but a "generally honest police officer may well be
more willing to lie at a suppression hearing than in a warrant application, because at that
point [he] knows the suspect is guilty, and that fact may make lying more palatable." Id. at
915 n.75 (emphasis added).
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so, if the law threatens the officer with jail for constitutional
violations ....
The temptation is to solve this problem by making the government,
rather than the individual police officer, bear the immediate costs of legal
liability. Unfortunately, that move solves nothing. Most police work for
local governments, and most local governments operate under serious
budget constraints. The effect of governmental damages liability for
police misconduct mimics the effect of making individual officers pay
damages: the locality has an incentive to reduce its liability by reducing
the level of policing.'1
If Professor Stuntz is right, and I think he is, if the exclusionary
rule were to be replaced with a meaningful "direct remedy," drug
offenders and other criminals would no longer be "released," but
approximately the same number (or more) would no longer be illegally
searched or arrested in the first place.
To be sure, we would not see the faces or know the names of the
criminals who remained free because the police never searched or
arrested them illegally. Nor would we know precisely what evidence
the police wrongfully acquired, because the direct remedy would
inhibit them from acquiring any evidence illegally. For these reasons,
the "direct alternative remedy" would not "rub[] our noses" in the
Fourth Amendment the way the exclusionary rule does."9 But beyond
that, what would really change? (Perhaps we would start talking about
the costs of the direct remedy or, better yet, the costs of the Fourth
Amendment, rather than the costs of the exclusionary rule.)
D. To the simple citizen who hears of guilty men exempted from
punishment by judicial decision it matters nothing what ulterior
motive lies in the judicial mind He knows only that the activities of
a dope-peddler, a notorious numbers racketeer, a score of gun-toters,
a counterfeiter, or a robber have not been considered wrongful
enough by the judge to justify conviction.t 20
118. Stuntz, Virtues and Vices, supra note 3, at 445-46. But see Slobogin, supra note 3, at
444: "With an effective deterrent [other than the exclusionary rule] in place, police who lack
probable cause will not necessarily give up; the more reasonable assumption is that they will
simply get more cause." I fail to see why this is the more reasonable assumption. (One might
have said the same thing about the exclusionary rule the day it went into effect.) Neither
drug enforcement agents nor police officers generally suffer from a shortage of business.
There are plenty of cases to investigate. If an officer lacks probable cause to make a search in
a particular case and he is worried about the impact on him of an effective direct remedy, the
more reasonable assumption, it seems to me, is that he will simply turn to another case
where he thinks he does have probable cause or believes he can easily acquire it.
Professor Slobogin does not even consider the possibility that in some instances the
police may not be able (or it may be too much of a hassle) to "get more cause." Id. at 444.
119. Kaplan, supra note 104, at 1037-38.
120. Waite (1955), supra note 1, at 192.
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Edward Barrett made a similar point at about the same time by
asking: "Is not the court which excludes illegally obtained evidence in
order to avoid condoning the acts of the officer by the same token
condoning the illegal acts of the defendant?" '121 I think not.
When courts admit unconstitutionally seized evidence, I do believe
it is likely that significant numbers of police officers, as well as large
segments of the public, will regard the official lawlessness as "not so
bad," else the courts would not have permitted the evidence to be
used. 22 On the other hand, I find it hard to believe that the exclusion
of evidence in a counterfeiting or burglary or narcotics case conveys a
comparable message to the police and the public that these crimes are
"not so bad." I can readily see how the admissibility of
unconstitutionally acquired evidence may foster police misconduct, for
the exclusionary rule is a "disincentive" - it removes a significant
incentive for making illegal searches, at least when the police
contemplate prosecution. But it is not easy to see how the exclusion of
evidence in a particular counterfeiting or drug case could operate to
promote future acts of counterfeiting or drug dealing.
So long as the exclusionary rule remains the only presently
available, meaningful sanction or counterweight against unlawful
searches and seizures (and even the rule's most robust critics concede
that) - so long as "such limits as there are on [police powers to search
and seize] are... both defined and enforced almost exclusively in
exclusionary rule litigation"'23 - I think it fair to say that abolition of
the rule and courts' use of illegally obtained evidence would likely be
viewed as condoning the underlying police lawlessness.
Surely, however, violating the Fourth Amendment is not the only
effective way nor the only feasible means presently available to bring a
criminal to justice. Surely no one can deny that during the exclusionary
rule era "apprehension and punishment [has been] pursued and
inflicted with sufficient determination" that a would-be criminal has to
"count them as substantial risks."'12 4 In the past twenty-five years the
121. Barrett, supra note 53, at 582; see also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2184, at 37 (3d ed. 1940).
122. A study of the attitudes of New York police toward the exclusionary rule,
Loewenthal found that "regardless of the effectiveness of direct sanctions, police officers
could neither understand nor respect a Court which purported to impose constitutional
standards on the police without excluding evidence obtained in violation of those
standards." Loewenthal, supra note 87, at 29-30. Most of the officers interviewed
"interpret[ed] the Wolf case [overruled in Mapp] as not having imposed any legal obligation
on the police since, under that decision, the evidence would still be admissible no matter
how it was obtained." Id.
123. Silas Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 257, 293-94 (1984).
124. Cf. Louis B. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA.
L. REV. 157, 158 (1954) ("A penal system gives us almost all we can get out of it if
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nation's prison population has quadrupled.125 The exclusionary rule
has had its greatest impact on drug offenses but, partly as a result of
tough mandatory sentences for these crimes, drug offenders have
"swell[ed] the prison population to a size beyond the wildest dreams
or nightmares of any mid-century law enforcement officers. ' 126
Since many lawful means are available to combat crime (including
drug offenses) and to convict criminals (including drug dealers), how
can it be seriously maintained that excluding the fruits of official
illegality in a particular case condones the criminal activity involved in
that case?
E. [The exclusionary rule] is a more or less frank choice of
policy; a judicial reaction to utilitarian assumptions.... There is no
explicit statement [in the Fourth Amendment or its state
constitutional counterparts] that evidence [obtained in violation of
these constitutional provisions] may not be used in court. Whether
some such preclusion is implicit depends upon judicial
interpretation. And no student of decisions would declare the
implication so obvious as to preclude a choice.127
Other critics of the exclusionary rule have hit this point even
harder than did Professor Waite. Thus, Judge Malcolm Wilkey
exclaimed: "[The exclusionary rule is] man-made, not God-given ....
It's not even in the Constitution. ' 12  More recently, Akhil Amar
complained that the Fourth Amendment "does not call for [and] does
not even invite, the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for an
unconstitutional search or seizure." '129 He went on to say that "the text
obviously does not support the ... exclusionary rule" and the relevant
history "emphatically rejects" it.13°
apprehension and punishment are pursued and inflicted with sufficient determination that a
would-be law violator must count them as substantial risks.").
125. ABRAMSKY, supra note 77, at xii. In the 1980s more than thirty states were under
court order because of prison overcrowding. See Peter Applebome, Texas Prisons Stop
Accepting Inmates Under Federal Order, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1987, at 1. The Texas prison
system "was forced to temporarily stop admitting new prisoners after its population crept
above levels mandated by a federal court order." Id.
126. ABRAMSKY, supra note 77, at 149; see also id. at 84 ("Nearly half of new admissions
in New York in recent years have been for drug crimes.").
127. Waite (1933), supra note 1, at 760; see also Waite (1955), supra note 1, at 171.
128. Charles McC. Mathias Jr., The Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 28 LoY. L. REV. 1, 7
(1982) (quoting Hearings before the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime (1998)
(statement of Judge Malcolm Wilkey)). The author of this article was then-Senator Mathias,
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Law. Shortly before this article
was published, Mathias's subcommittee had held extensive hearings on various proposals to
replace or to modify the exclusionary rule.
129. Amar, Against Exclusion, supra note 62, at 459.
130. Id.
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How can (should) a defender of the exclusionary rule respond to
this criticism? One way is to turn to Professor Davies' study of the
"original Fourth Amendment."
II. THOMAS DAVIES SHEDS LIGHT ON WHY THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE IS "NOT EVEN IN THE CONSTITUTION.
131
A plausible explanation for the failure of the Fourth Amendment
to provide explicitly for an "exclusionary rule" is that the Framers did
not focus on after the fact judicial control. (And, if they had, they
probably would have assumed that not much illegally seized material
would be offered in evidence.) The Framers concentrated on, and put
their trust in, the warrant procedure. As Justice Jackson once
observed, the Fourth Amendment "roughly indicate[s] the immunity
of the citizen which must not be violated, goes on to recite how
officers may be authorized, consistently with the right so declared, to
make searches,""3 2 and then comes to an end, "apparently because [the
Framers] believed that by thus controlling search warrants they had
controlled searches.' 1 33
Justice Jackson displayed a good grasp of the Framer's sense of the
centrality of warrant authority, but furnished no supporting evidence
for his conclusion. Fortunately, others, especially Thomas Davies,
have - quite a bit.
As Davies spells out in his 1999 Michigan Law Review article, the
Framers' statements about search and seizure "focused on
condemning general warrants"; indeed, their "historical concerns were
almost exclusively about the need to ban house searches under general
warrants."' ' 4 One reason the Framers thought that control of warrant
authority, especially the prohibition against general warrant authority,
"would suffice to preserve the right to be secure in person and house"
was that they considered the ex officio authority of the framing-era
officer to be meager.'35 At common law, then, "controlling the warrant
did control the officer for all practical purposes.' 13 6
Another reason the Fourth Amendment does not specifically
address warrantless searches and seizures is that the Framers
131. See supra text accompanying note 128.
132. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 195-96 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 196 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Kamisar, Exclusionary Rule, supra note
91, at 571-79; Maclin, supra note 3, at 47 n.218; Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 83 (1988).
134. Davies, supra note 2, at 551.
135. Id. at 554.
136. Id.
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did not anticipate that a wrongful act by an officer might constitute a
form of government illegality - rather, they viewed such misconduct as
only a personal trespass by the person who held the office. Thus there
was neither a need nor a basis for addressing the conduct of a warrantless
officer in a constitutional provision regulating government authority.
37
Although Telford Taylor and Davies differ over other aspects of
the "original understanding" of the Fourth Amendment, they agree
that the Framers did not fear, and did not have in mind, the eighteenth
century peace officer. 3 ' This is hardly surprising.
"[A]t the time of the drafting and ratifying of the Fourth
Amendment, nothing even remotely resembling modern law
enforcement existed."'39 As I have noted elsewhere:
Two hundred years ago the police had not yet assumed the functions of
criminal investigation - indeed, no organized police forces had yet
emerged. Until well into the nineteenth century, the only "police service"
of any kind, even in our largest cities, was the "watch system" and "such
protection as [it] afforded was provided only by night - generally
between the hours of nine o'clock in the evening and sunrise" (and
"'sunrise" was variously interpreted as between three o'clock and five
o'clock in the morning). 140
As Davies observes, the peace officer of the framing-era, most
commonly a constable who worked part-time and was not paid a
salary, t41 "often depended on the assistance of bystanders to execute
an arrest. ' 1142 If the officer attempted an arrest or search without a
137. Id.
138. As Professor Taylor observes, neither warrantless searches incident to arrest nor
searches pursuant to specific warrants, such as the common-law warrant for stolen goods,
concerned the colonists. See TAYLOR, supra note 113, at 38-44. The only victims of
warrantless searches "were those who, as probable felons, were the objects of hue and cry,
hot pursuit, or an arrest warrant." These searches posed "no threat to the honest
householder, no fear of arrogant 'messengers' breaking open desks or trunks to search for
smuggled jewels or libellous documents." Id. at 39. As for the common-law warrant for
stolen goods, it "embodied the requisites of 'reasonable' search." Id. at 40.
139. Steiker, supra note 3, at 824. Professor Steiker adds, and I heartily agree with her:
The invention in the nineteenth century of armed, quasi-military, professional police forces,
whose form, function and daily presence differ dramatically from that of the colonial
constabulary, requires that modern-day judges and scholars rethink both the relationship
between "reasonableness" and "warrants" and the nature of the Fourth Amendment
remedies.
Id.
140. Kamisar, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 91, at 571-72 (quoting RAYMOND B.
FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEMS 61-62 (1920)). It was not until 1844 that the New
York Legislature passed a law "creating 'a day and night police,' which forms the basis of
modem police organization in America." FOSDICK, supra, at 66.
141. Davies, supra note 2, at 620-21.
142. Id. at 621.
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warrant then, as various common law sources described it, he acted
" 'at his own risk' or 'at his peril.' ,143
In colonial days, "a search or arrest was presumed [to be] an
unlawful trespass unless 'justified.' ",144 And unlawful or unjustified
arrests not only exposed the offending officer to suits for trespass
damages (at a time when "[t]he common law recognized no broad
doctrine of official immunity")145 but to "lawful resistance by
bystanders or the target of his intrusion." '146
"The most salient feature of common-law authority for present
purposes," emphasizes Davies, "is that a valid (specific) arrest or
search warrant provided the officer with the clearest and strongest
source of justification for an intrusion. '14' "As long as [the constable]
acted 'ministerially' - [i.e.,] within the [confines] of the warrant - it
was an offense to resist him, or even refuse to assist him. 1 148 Moreover,
as long as he acted as the agent of the justice of the peace, the
constable "was 'indemnified' against trespass liability.' '149
The search and seizure cases of the 1760s that so greatly influenced
the Framers - in London, the lawsuits by John Wilkes, John Entick
and others against Lord Halifax and his messengers and in Boston, the
protest against writs of assistance by James Otis - have a common
characteristic. They involved, as Telford Taylor has noted, general
warrants, statutory in origin, not warrants "subject to the restrictions
and safeguards that the common law had thrown around the stolen
goods warrant." 5' "It is both striking and enlightening," adds Taylor,
"that independently, in London and Boston, the opponents of the
[general] warrants based their attack primarily on unfavorable
comparisons with the stolen goods warrants. 15'
143. Id. at 627.
144. Id. at 624.
145. Id. at 625.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 626. Lawrence Lessig observes:
Essential to the Fourth Amendment [in the framing-era] was a structural incentive, one built
in by the common law. As originally conceived, the police (or their equivalents) had a very
strong personal incentive to secure a warrant before searches or seizures, for without a
warrant, they were liable personally for their trespass .... [O]f course essential to this
incentive was a common-law system of remedies that actually made it true that the police
had an incentive - that is, a common-law system through which the wronged citizen could
get damages for the wrongful search or seizure by the state official.
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1165, 1229-30 (1993).
148. Davies, supra note 2, at 626-27.
149. Id. at 627.
150. TAYLOR, supra note 113, at 40.
151. Id. For further discussion, see id. at 34, 37.
1854 [Vol. 100:1821
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1854 2001-2002
The Exclusionary Rule
Were the Framers justified in putting their trust in the warrant
procedure, i.e., the framing-era judges who were to issue warrants?
Did the Framers have reason to think the courts might approve of
general warrants on their own initiative? Akhil Amar believes so. He
maintains that because they feared the "immunizing" effect of a
warrant, the Framers viewed the "judges and warrants" as the
"heavies.", 152
Morgan Cloud has serious doubts about Professor Amar's claim
that the Founders viewed judges as enemies of liberty and privacy in
the context of searches and seizures. After noting that most colonial
courts denied the general writ that customs officials sought in the
1760s and 70s and that, even when colonial judges were willing to
grant more specific writs, customs officials believed they were
attempting to obstruct enforcement of customs laws. 153 Professor
Cloud comments:
The history of these controversies permits, and perhaps even compels,
the conclusion that in the years preceding the Revolution numerous
colonial judges were important impediments to the use of writs of
assistance to conduct general searches to enforce the customs laws. Had
Professor Amar's examination of the Amendment's history considered
this data, he might have reconsidered his views about judges. 154
Davies' response to Amar's claim is more forceful:
152. Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 63, 67 (1996) (referring to "the guarantee of immunity provided by
a warrant"). No one denies that warrants were one of a number of defenses available to
searchers sued for trespass. However, Morgan Cloud points out:
[T]o extrapolate from this narrow fact the broad principle that warrants served no protective
function is simply to ignore the development of specific warrants. General warrants may
have been akin to a license to search, but specific warrants came into prominence,
particularly in the United States after 1782. precisely because they protected citizens' rights
against such unreasonable methods.
Cloud, supra note 7, at 1730 (essay review of William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment:
Origins and Original Meaning (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
School)).
153. See Cloud, supra note 7, at 1738-39; Maclin, supra note 3, at 22-23; see also
Kamisar, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 91, at 575 (quoting JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 36-37 (1966) and NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 69-
70, 72-73 (1937)):
Even after the Townshend Act of 1767 had disposed of all technical objections to the legality
of the writs of assistance - even "in the face of mounting pressure from the executive -
which paid their salaries and could at any time remove them, or offer them preferment" -
the judges of most of the colonies had either refused or ignored applications for the writs.
Surely an "independent judiciary" could be counted on to take seriously the command of the
Fourth Amendment.
154. Cloud, supra note 7, at 1739. Professor Cloud relies primarily on William J.
Cuddihy's exhaustive 1696 page unpublished doctoral dissertation on the origins and original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but he notes that other historians have documented the
same behavior by colonial judges. Id. at 1739 n.11.
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[The claim] lacks historical support. The Framers did not express any
general antagonism toward judges regarding search matters. In fact, Lord
Camden, a judge, emerged as the hero of the Wilkesite cases, and the
colonial judges who refused to issue general writs under the Townshend
Act provided an example that may well have stimulated the developing
American conception of judicial review.
[Moreover, Amar's claim about the "immunizing" effect of a warrant] is
more in the nature of a hypothesis than a historical observation: it is not
evident in historical statements .... [The sources Amar cites] expressed
concern only that "general warrants" might be made legal - not concern
regarding the "immunizing" effect of specific warrants. Amar has never
identified a single historical complaint about the "immunizing" effect of
a specific warrant.'55
Although "the highly visible rulings in the Wilkesite cases had
removed any possibility of upholding general warrants at common
law,"'56 those cases explicitly left open the possibility that general
warrants might be made lawful by legislation.'57 "Thus, the Framers'
constitutional concern was preventing the legislature from authorizing
use of general warrants."'58
155. Davies, supra note 2, at 586-88. Davies uses the
"Wilkesite cases" [also called the General Warrant Cases] as a collective label for the English
trespass cases brought by [John] Wilkes and his supporters. The first set of cases were
brought [in the early 1760s] by victims of a "nameless" general warrant (issued by the
Secretary of State, Lord Halifax) that had directed the king's messengers to identify the
persons responsible for publishing The North Briton No. 45 .... The messengers arrested
[many people].., searched [many] houses and seized private papers. The victims then
brought trespass cases in the Court of Common Pleas presided over by Charles Pratt (later
Lord Camden)... [who instructed the] juries that the general warrant was illegal .... [T]he
juries awarded trespass damages to the plaintiff victims ....
A second set of cases... [grew out of a series] of arrests and searches involving publication
of The Monitor. Those warrants identified the persons to be arrested, but were general as to
the papers to be seized .... The main case was Entick v. Carrington (C.P. 1765), in which
Lord Camden (Pratt) ruled that the papers search warrant was illegal ....
Parliament in 1766 passed resolutions condemning general warrants ... at least for certain
purposes, unless Parliament itself authorized them. The final development came in the 1769
trial of Wilkes v. Halifax, in which John Wilkes won a judgment of 4000 pounds against
[Lord] Halifax for having issued the "nameless" general warrant.
Id. at 563 n.21 (citation omitted).
156. Davies, supra note 2, at 657-58 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Wilkesite
cases, see supra note 155.
157. Davies, supra note 2, at 658. In fact, as Davies points out, "after the Wilkesite
cases .... Parliament reauthorized the general writs of assistance in the Townshend Act of
1767." Id.
158. Id. As Davies notes, "[w]hen describ[ing] the reason for declaration of rights, [the
American Framers] typically stated that the declarations were meant to curb legislative
power." Id. at 658 n.302. Consider, too, Justice O'Connor's dissent in Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340 (1987):
Statutes authorizing unreasonable searches were the core concern of the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment. This Court has repeatedly noted that reaction against the ancient Act
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I think Silas Wasserstrom summed it up nicely two decades ago
when he wrote, "[it] was not a lawless judiciary that the framers
feared, but legislative tyranny and a treacherous executive. The
framers believed that without a constitutional prohibition, the
legislature would authorize issuance of general warrants by statute,
just as Parliament had authorized the writs of assistance." '159
An explicit constitutional prohibition would have (or should have)
prevented Congress from authorizing general warrants. Moreover,
even if Congress violated the explicit prohibition, general warrants
had to be issued by judges and they could enforce the prohibition
"simply by refusing to act." 16°
So why was there any need for a remedy which has come to be
known as the "exclusionary rule"?
James Madison, who undertook the task of drafting a proposal for
federal rights amendments, did not want the rights amendments to
appear in a supplemental bill of rights. He proposed instead that
"most of the rights amendments" - including the provision that
became the Fourth Amendment - "be added to Article I's limitations
on Congressional power. ' 161 This is a strong indication that "Madison
conceived his proposal as a deprivation of Congress's power to
authorize use of general warrants - not as a constraint on the conduct
of ordinary officers.' ' 62
of Parliament authorizing indiscriminate general searches by writs of assistance ... was the
moving force behind the Fourth Amendment.
480 U.S. 340, 362 (1987) (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting) (rejecting the holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when police act in
objectively reasonable reliance on a statute which authorizing what turns out to be an
unlawful search).
159. Wasserstrom, supra note 123, at 287. "[T]he warrants at issue in the ["Wilkesite"
or] General Warrant Cases were not judicial warrants at all, but were issued by Lord Halifax,
an executive official." Id. at 286.
160. Davies, supra note 2, at 701, 702. After all, a court's refusal to act was "the remedy
Otis had sought in 1761 and that the colonial courts had provided when they refused to issue
'illegal' general writs under the Townshend Act." Id.
161. Id. at 700. The placement of the search and seizure provision in a separate "bill of
rights" did not occur until the eleventh hour. After the "Committee of Eleven" of the House
of Representatives had endorsed Madison's proposal to insert the rights amendments with
the text of the Constitution and after the full House had debated the search and seizure
provision (but before the conclusion of the debate on all the rights amendments), Roger
Sherman's motion to put the amendments in a supplementary document passed. Id. at 715
n.475.
According to Professor Davies, Sherman's motion did not seem to reflect any
disagreement that the amendments should be aimed at Congress. Rather, he "seems to have
sought the supplementary format in the hope of downgrading the importance of the
amendments, and possibly of warding off additional amendments to the Constitution." Id. at
716 n.475.
162. Id. at 700-01. Madison's single-clause version of what became the Fourth
Amendment did not address warrantless intrusions. Rather his proposal defined what he
called "[t]he rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers,
and their other property from all unreasonable searches and seizures" solely in terms of
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This helps explain why Madison's provision contained no
statement of a remedy for a violation of the search and seizure right.
First of all, an explicit limitation on congressional power would
prevent Congress from authorizing general warrants. In any event, the
Framers "would have expected, at a minimum, that courts would
decline to enforce legislation that conflicted with the essential rights
announced in the Constitution. "163
There is still another reason the Fourth Amendment does not
contain an exclusionary principle or any other "remedy" for peace
officers' violations of the search and seizure provision. The Framers
"did not equate an officer's misconduct with government illegality;
rather they perceived only personal misconduct when an officer
exceeded his official authority."1" Therefore, "they had neither a
motive nor a basis for addressing the conduct of ordinary officers in
constitutional provisions."165
]
If the Fourth Amendment's controls on the issuance of warrants
were "the answer of the Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of
searches without warrants and searches with warrants unrestricted in
scope,""6 they are not a sufficient answer today. Nor have they been
for quite some time. The reason is that in the nineteenth century,
various developments "destroyed the common-law premises" that had
led the Framers to believe "that a ban against general warrants would
suffice to ensure the right to be secure in person and house":
167
New concerns about crime and social disorder during the nineteenth
century gave rise to a perception that the common-law structure of law
enforcement was inadequate to meet the needs of an increasingly
complex and urban society. Contemporaneously with the advent of
"warrants issued without probable cause., or not particularly describing the places to be
searched, or the person or things to be seized." Id. at 697 (quoting James Madison, Speech to
the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789) in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977).
163. Davies, supra note 2, at 701.
164. Id. at 660. "The exclusionary rule," adds Davies, "is premised on the notion that an
unconstitutional government act is void - but exclusion has never been seriously proposed
as a consequence of private wrongdoing." Id. at 663.
165. Id. at 663.
166. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter's position in this case was adopted when Rabinowitz was overruled in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
167. Davies, supra note 2, at 725.
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police departments and career officers, courts and legislatures drastically
expanded the ex officio authority of the warrantless officer. 68
These developments pushed warrant authority toward the margins of
law enforcement procedure and thus destroyed the common-law
premises that had grounded the Framers' belief that a ban against
general warrants would suffice to ensure the right to be secure in person
and house. Likewise, these developments undermined trespass actions
against individual officers as a means of enforcing legal limits on search
and arrest authority. By the end of the nineteenth century, the
warrantless officer posed a far more potent threat to the security of
person and house than the Framers had ever anticipated. 69
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment could hardly have been
expected to foresee a time when the great bulk of searches and
seizures would be made without any warrants7 ' - a time when a
single police force would make tens of thousands of warrantless
searches every year.'7 ' Worse still, "the state tort actions that provided
the traditional remedy for false arrest and trespass had become
ineffective against modern police departments." '72 The Framers had
concentrated their fire on general warrants because in their immediate
past unacceptable executive discretion had taken this particular form,
but the social and legal environment had changed so dramatically that
controlling warrants could no longer control searches and seizures.
Applying the "original meaning of the language of the Fourth
Amendment" in a very different world "would subvert the purpose the
Framers had in mind when they adopted the text." '73 Davies continues:
The text of the Fourth Amendment clearly anticipated that there would
be a "right to be secure" in one's person, house, papers, and effects. If
there is any term in the text that might be described as the core or
essence of the provision, "right to be secure" is the leading candidate.
Thus, one should not advocate a modern meaning for the Fourth
168. Id. As Davies observes elsewhere in his article, during the nineteenth century the
justification for warrantless arrests by officers were relaxed. The officer no longer had to
prove that the felony for which he had made an arrest had actually been committed. The
officer was also allowed to rely on unsworn information provided to him by others even
when no one else made a felony charge. These developments sapped the validity of the
trespass remedy as a means of regulating warrantless arrests. Moreover, since an innocent
person could not easily tell whether the arresting officer had "probable cause," the right to
resist unlawful arrest "became unworkable and gradually collapsed." The emergence of
professional police, and eventually armed police, also made resistance to unlawful arrests
imprudent. Id. at 634-39.
169. Id. at 725.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 111-114.
171. See supra note 113.
172. Dripps, supra note 44, at 1600.
173. Davies, supra note 2, at 740-41.
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Amendment that would render the right to be secure a practical
nullity.
17 4
At the opportune time, probably as the result of the development
of "state action" doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment, police
misconduct came to be viewed as government illegality.175 Finally,
more than a century after the framing, both a need and a doctrinal
basis existed for applying the command of the Fourth Amendment to
the conduct of a warrantless officer.176
In the landmark Weeks case,177 the Court saw the need to adapt the
Fourth Amendment to the dramatically changed socio-legal context
and utilized the new doctrinal basis for doing so. 178 The Weeks Court,
per Justice Day, stated that the protection of the Fourth Amendment
"is equally extended to the action of the Government and officers of
the law acting under it.' 79 Moreover, the Court characterized the
unlawfulsearch by the federal marshal as misconduct "under color of
his office in direct violation of the constitutional rights of the
defendant."'8 ° "Put simply, Weeks initiated the development of
modern doctrine by reading the Fourth Amendment as a broad
protection of a right to be secure in one's house and papers rather
than as a simple ban against general warrants."''
7
"[C]hanging the law," or, one might say, changing social and legal
institutions, a noted legal philosopher observed, "is like making a
change in the intricate plot of a highly organized drama. You cannot
change one part without other parts being affected in unexpected
ways. 18
2
A good illustration is Tennessee v. Garner,"3 which held that,
unless the police have probable cause to believe that the suspect poses
a danger to the police or to the community at large, a police killing of
174. Id. at 741.
175. See id. at 554, 667. As we have seen, the Framers viewed warrantless intrusions by a
peace officer as only a personal trespass by the officer.
176. See id. at 667, 729-30.
177. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
178. As Davies points out, Weeks was decided only a year after the Court held, in Home
TeL & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913), that conduct by a state
regulator alleged to violate state law was misconduct "under color of" state law and
therefore constituted state action. Davis, supra note 2, at 730 n.519.
179. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
181. Davies, supra note 2, at 730-31; see also Maclin, supra note 3, at 49-51.
182. MORRIs R. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 421 (2d ed. 1953).
183. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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a fleeing felon is an "unreasonable seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The state insisted that because the prevailing
view in the framing era (and for a considerable time thereafter) was
that, in order to effectuate an arrest, a peace officer could kill any
fleeing felon, whatever the circumstances, that rule must be upheld
200 years later. '81 A 6-3 majority, per White, J., disagreed:
Because of sweeping change in the legal and technological context [since
the eighteenth century], reliance on the common-law rule in this case
would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical
inquiry. 85
[T]hough the common-law pedigree of Tennessee's rule is pure on its
face, changes in the legal and technological context [these past 200 years]
mean the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally
applied.86
Justice White explained that the common-law rule arose at a time
when virtually all felonies were punishable by death (and thus the
killing of a resisting or fleeing felon resulted in no greater
"punishment" than that authorized for the crime of which he was
suspected), and at a time when all felons were considered quite
dangerous. But these justifications for the old rule do not "make[]
sense today."'87 For almost all crimes once "punishable by death no
longer are or can be."' 88 Moreover, many crimes that were
misdemeanors at common law or nonexistent at that time are now
classified as felonies. Indeed, nowadays "numerous misdemeanors
involve conduct more dangerous than many felonies." '89
Still another historical point had to be made: the common law had
formed long before handguns were carried by the police."9 Thus the
old rule had developed at a time when the police could use deadly
force "almost solely in a hand-to-hand struggle during which,
necessarily, the safety of the arresting officer was at risk.'' 9. Not until
more than a half-century after the adoption of the Fourth Amendment
"did it become possible [for the police] to use deadly force from a
184. See id. at 12-13.
185. Id. at 13.
186. Id. at 15.
187. Id. at 14.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Police officers did not carry handguns, pointed out the Court, until the second half
of the nineteenth century. Id. at 15.
191. Id. at 14-15.
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distance as a means of apprehension.' 19 2 Thus, an officer's "use of
deadly force under the standard articulation of the common-law rule
has an altogether different meaning - and harsher consequences -
now than in past centuries."'93
What Professor Davies has done is essentially what the Garner
Court did when it showed why the common-law rule regarding fleeing
felons no longer made much sense. In the exclusionary rule context
too, the "sweeping changes" that have occurred in the past 200 years
- the decline and fall of the tort remedy against transgressing officers,
the development of armed, professional police with powers far greater
than those of the eighteenth century peace officer to make warrantless
arrests and searches and to overcome resisting suspects, and the vast
increase in the number of warrantless arrests and searches that take
place every day - mean that literally applying the Fourth
Amendment, with its framing era premises and assumptions, would
greatly distort - indeed, subvert - "(t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects."' 94
"[T]he temper of the... arguments in the Federalist papers and
other contemporaneous discussion, the action of the early Congresses
and the language of the early opinions," Telford Taylor once
observed, "are all to me instinct with the notion of a charter intended
to preserve certain values through, and in spite of, changing
circumstances in the future."'95 If so (and I cannot believe that many
students of constitutional law would disagree with Professor Taylor),
what the Court did in the Weeks case is quite appropriate. Just as, as
almost everyone recognizes, "changes in technological circumstances
inform constitutional interpretation, as with electronic surveillance, so
changes in the legal environment need to be taken into account."'96
After all, "if we do not want a rubber Constitution, neither do we want
a rusty one."'197
III. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
"If history could be told in all its complexity and detail," an astute
historian once observed, "it would provide us with something as
192. Id. at 15.
193. Id.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Alschuler, supra note 116, at 206. See generally
Kramer, supra note 7, at 1639, 1641.
195. TAYLOR, supra note 113, at 12-13.
196. Dripps, supra note 44, at 1600.
197. TAYLOR, supra note 113, at 14.
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chaotic and baffling as life itself." '198 However, this historian goes on to
say, because history can be condensed, "there is nothing that cannot
be made to seem simple, and the chaos acquires form by virtue of
what we choose to omit." 199
Therefore, although I concur in George Thomas's view that
Thomas Davies' proof of the "original understanding" of the Fourth
Amendment "is a little less than incontestable, but for me... utterly
convincing,"2" I am well aware that an opponent of the exclusionary
rule may say of him what a supporter of the rule may say of someone
like Akhil Amar:
[W]e must beware even of saying, 'History says...' or 'History
proves... ' as though she herself were the oracle .... Rather we must
say to ourselves: 'She will lie to us till the very end of the last cross-
examination.' 20 1
Indeed, someone unhappy with the conclusions that Davies (or
Amar) has reached might put it still more forcefully: It is a remarkable
if familiar fact that law professors, like Supreme Court Justices, almost
always find that the Framers' views mirror their own.202
Relying in part on an article by Carol Steiker (who states that
"almost no one" really believes that "we should be bound for all time
by the specific intentions or expectations of the Framers" about, inter
alia, "what sorts of remedies are required for violations of the Fourth
Amendment"),2 3 Wayne LaFave concludes that, although "surely
relevant," reliance on the "intent of the Framers" and the history of
the Fourth Amendment "is of limited utility" in determining the scope
and content of the Amendment.2 °4
Professor Davies, no less than Professors LaFave and Steiker, is
uneasy about reading the provisions of the Bill of Rights as statements
of broad principles:
198. HERBERT BUTrERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 97 (W.W.
Norton 1965) (1931). I am indebted to Morgan Cloud for calling this book to my attention.
199. Id.
200. George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 155 n.32 (2001).
201. BUTrERFIELD, supra note 198, at 131-32.
202. This is a slightly revised version of David Sklansky's comment about "the
remarkable if familiar fact that Supreme Court Justices, like law professors, almost always
find that the Framers' views mirror their own." David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment
and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1770 (2000).
203. Professor LaFave quotes a long passage from Steiker, supra note 3, at 823-24. A
portion of this passage is quoted in note 213 infra.
204. See LAFAVE, supra note 16, § 1.1(a), at 6. Of course, if I were Professor LaFave,
and had written three editions of what is now a five-volume treatise on the contemporary
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to say nothing about many annual pocket parts, I would
not be too excited either about writing one or two volumes on the history of the Fourth
Amendment.
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The historical record of the framing indicates that the Framers saw the
Fourth Amendment as a specific constitutional barricade against the
unique threat which legislative approval of general warrants posed for
the structure of common-law authority - not as a general statement of
an abstract principle ....
The fact that we now face issues the Framers never anticipated may leave
us little choice but to treat the constitutional texts as expressions of
broad principles, rather than as specific solutions to specific historical
threats. Indeed, the expansive treatment now accorded the Bill of Rights
can be justified as a replacement for the Framers' unfulfilled expectation
of a permanent structure of common law rights. However, we should not
confuse our predicament with the historical character of the texts. At
least as far as the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights are
concerned, the retreat to principles is only a modern response to changed
circumstances; it is not the Framers' understanding of the text.
20 5
Davies - again, no less than LaFave and Steiker - is also aware
of the difficulties involved in forming a clear picture of the Framers'
"intentions" or "expectations" about the constitutional provisions,206
but he maintains that the Framers intentions and expectations
regarding the Fourth Amendment (or at least certain aspects)
constitute an exception:
One objection that is sometimes raised regarding attribution of the
original meaning or purpose of a constitutional text is that such
statements ignore the likely variation of attitudes and understandings
that may have existed among the various groups of persons (drafters,
federal legislators, state legislators, commentators) who might be lumped
together under the label of "Framers." I have no doubt that is a genuine
difficulty for assessing the historical meaning of certain aspects of the
Constitution or especially of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is possible
to speak of "the" original meaning of the Fourth Amendment, however,
because there simply is no indication in the historical sources of any
controversy or disagreement as to its meaning (with the exception of the
mysterious choice of "effects") among any of the persons who could be
considered "Framers.,
20 7
Although his prodigious research, thoughtful analysis, and careful
writing suggest otherwise, Professor Davies may have overstated his
case. Unless and until someone else comes along and shows the flaws
in his study, however, Davies' historical research cannot be ignored in
the never-ending debate over the exclusionary rule.
I hasten to add that I would be willing, indeed happy, to engage in
a debate over the exclusionary rule without regard to colonial history
and the "intent" or "expectations" of the Framers. But as long as
205. Davies, supra note 2, at 745.
206. See Steiker, supra note 3, at 823.
207. Davies, supra note 2, at 723-24 n.505.
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opponents of the exclusionary rule maintain that the Fourth
Amendment "does not require," "call for" or "even invite" the
exclusionary rule 2° and as long as some Supreme Court justices
believe that the Court is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution ' 209 it will be hard to keep the colonial history and the
"intent" of the Framers out of the debate. It will be hard, as Professor
Steiker puts it, for supporters of the exclusionary rule to resist
"fight[ing] fire with fire. '2 1 °
Moreover, and more generally, it is all very well to talk about the
need to "formulate notions of the Framers' intent at some higher level
of abstraction '21   and, as times change, "to accommodate
constitutional purposes more general than the Framers' specific
intentions, 21 2 but how does one go about doing this without first
determining the Framers' specific intentions? And how does one go
about identifying the significant ways in which conditions have
changed since colonial times without first establishing what colonial
times were like?
Davies does discuss, at considerable length, why the Framers
omitted from the text of the Fourth Amendment any mention of a
remedy for violating it. More generally, he discusses why the Framers
probably never thought at all about an exclusionary rule or, if they
did, why they did not believe one was necessary. But colonial history is
not the only history he talks about. Davies also spends much time and
effort explaining why and how, in the many years since the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment, changing times and changing circumstances
seriously undermined the presuppositions and expectations regarding
the drafting and adoption of the search and seizure provision.
It strikes me that this is essentially what Professor Steiker did,
albeit in much more summary fashion (and she did it quite well), when
she responded to what might be called Professor Amar's
"intentionalist/originalist" attack on the search and seizure
exclusionary rule.13
208. Amar, Against Exclusion, supra note 62, at 459; see also Amar, First Principles,
supra note 3, at 785 (claiming that the Supreme Court "has concocted the awkward and
embarrassing" search and seizure exclusionary rule). Consider, too, Professor Amar's
contention that colonial history "emphatically rejects any idea of exclusion." Amar, Against
Exclusion, supra note 62, at 459.
209. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
210. Steiker, supra note 3, at 822 ("A common reaction to invocations of intentionalist
authority is to fight fire with fire.").
211. Id. at 824.
212. Id.
213. Observed Professor Steiker:
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Telford Taylor once asked: "Does the Constitution mean what it
was meant to mean, or what it has come to mean, or what it ought to
mean?" ' 4 If I understand him correctly, he gave the most weight to
what the Constitution has come to mean.1 5
If so, the search and seizure exclusionary rule should fare well. The
federal exclusionary rule was established in 1914, the "stone age" for
American constitutional-criminal procedure. The exclusionary rule
was imposed on the states many years later,26 but still some time
before Gideon217 and Miranda.21s What the Court said of Miranda two
years ago may surely be said of the exclusionary rule as well: it has
become "part of our national culture.
21 9
[Professor Amar's focus on colonial history, inter alia, to attack the exclusionary rule]
ignores at least two crucial changes between colonial times and the present that must inform
our current readings of the Fourth Amendment as a whole. First, at the time of the drafting
and ratifying of the Fourth Amendment, nothing even remotely resembling modern law
enforcement existed. The invention in the nineteenth century of armed, quasi-military,
professional police forces, whose form, function, and daily presence differ dramatically from
that of the colonial constabulary, requires that modern-day judges and scholars rethink...
the nature of Fourth Amendment remedies. Second, the intensification of inter-racial
conflict in our society during the Civil War and Reconstruction, and the myriad ways in
which this conflict has intersected with law enforcement, likewise necessitate new
constructions of the Fourth Amendment. It is no accident that the modern pillars of Fourth
Amendment law attacked by Professor Amar were significantly fortified during the 1960s at
the same time that the Supreme Court and the rest of the country began to address
systematically our legacy of racial discrimination.
Id.
214. TAYLOR, supra note 113, at 5.
215. See id. at 7, 14-15.
216. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
217. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
218. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
219. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). In fact, some twenty years
ago, shortly after he had stepped down from the Supreme Court, Justice Potter Stewart did
state that "the exclusionary rule is now part of our legal culture." Potter Stewart, The Road
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule
in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1386 (1983).
Consider, too, Taylor, writing in 1969:
Apart from expressing a belief that [Mapp] is here to stay, I will only venture a reminder
that the Court's division in the case, sharp as it was, did not concern the merits of the
exclusionary rule. The disagreement concerned only the federal dimension of the
constitutional question: should the states by left free to apply or not to apply the
exclusionary rule according to state law? ... [T]here is not a word in the dissenting opinions
suggesting that the rule is intrinsically bad. Especially in view of the pre-Mapp trend in the
state courts, I should think it likely that the case will weather even substantial changes in the
Court's membership.
TAYLOR, supra note 113, at 20-21.
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